European Parliament

## The European Elections of

 May 2019
## Electoral systems and outcomes

## STUDY

EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service
Kai Friederike Oelbermann and Friedrich Pukelsheim

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#### Abstract

This EPRS study provides an overview of the electoral systems and outcomes in the May 2019 elections to the European Parliament. It analyses the procedural details of how parties and candidates register their participation, how votes are cast, how valid votes are converted into seats, and how seats are assigned to candidates. For each Member State the paper describes the ballot structure and vote pattern used, the apportionment of seats among the Member State's domestic parties, and the assignment of the seats of a party to its candidates. It highlights aspects that are common to all Member States and captures peculiarities that are specific to some domestic provisions.


## AUTHOR(S)

This study has been written by Kai-Friederike Oelbermann (Anhalt University of Applied Sciences) and Friedrich Pukelsheim (University of Augsburg) at the request of the Members' Research Service, within the Directorate-General for Parliamentary Research Services (EPRS) of the Secretariat of the European Parliament.

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## Executive summary

In this study, the European Parliament (EP) elections of May 2019 are analysed with a particular emphasis on procedural electoral rules: on how votes are cast, how seats are distributed among the different political parties and how they are distributed afterwards within the different electoral lists to determine the elected candidates. Ballot structure and vote pattern, the apportionment of seats among domestic parties, and the assignment of the seats of a party to its candidates are discussed in detail, separately for every Member State of the European Union.

Section 2 divides the conversion of votes into seats into three phases: (1) the allocation of all seats between the Member States; (2) the apportionment of the seat contingent of a Member State among its domestic parties; and (3) the assignment of the seats of a domestic party to its candidates. The situations before and after the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union are treated, with a total of 751 and 705 EP seats respectively. For the apportionment of seats among parties, nine different methods were used at the elections; they are reviewed in a unified manner. The voting patterns in the Member States comprised various list systems and single transferable vote schemes. The voting patterns are detailed and labelled in a way that is indicative of how they actually determine successful candidates. Table 2.3.1 puts together some of the structural data; Table 2.4.1 shows the Political Groups that formed in the new EP.

Section 3 present pertinent data from the 2019 elections separately for every MemberState, such as number of constituencies or electoral districts, vote pattern, electoral threshold, parties who participate in the apportionment process, and vote counts that enter into the calculations. The transition from the parties' votes to their seats and from the seats of a party to its successful candidates is followed up so as to identify incumbent Members of the EPs.

Section 4 provides an attempt to see the 2019 elections from a Union-wide perspective. The actual size of a political group in the EP is compared with the hypothetical number of seats the group would have been apportioned on the basis of its electoral support. The electoral support of a group is obtained by summing up the votes of all domestic parties who joined it. The emerging discrepancies emphasise yet again the political challenges evolving from trying to raise the implementation of common principles to a higher level at future European elections.

Section 5 concludes with a brief'contextualisation' to the history and political impact of the electoral reform. Important work in electoral-systems research suggests that further harmonisation of the current system of quasi-national elections analysed in this study will remain an essential ambition for European decision-makers if they wish to make the European elections a more effective instrument of Union-wide democratic legitimation.

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## 1. Introduction

The ninth European Parliament (EP), with a five-year term from 2019 to 2024 was elected on 23-26 May 2019. This study is devoted to the electoral procedures leading from votes to parliamentary seats, and from seats to Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). Ourfocus is on procedural standards implemented by the Member States of the European Union (EU) at the 2019 elections, rather than on the political consequences of the elections as such. ${ }^{1}$

The heterogeneity of electoral regulations is formidable and perplexing. ${ }^{2}$ The common principles which the 2019 elections had to follow are laid down in the 1976 European Election Act. This decrees a number of general rules to be observed by all Member States, such as to adopt a proportional representation system, while leaving much leeway for each Member State when incorporating the common principles into its domestic provisions. Duff (2011) reviews the history of the Election Act and includes a consolidated version of the 1976 Election Act amended by the 2002 act. ${ }^{3}$

Below we compile data on procedures, voters, parties, candidates and MEPs, with as much of a unified structureand terminology as possible, in an attemptto survey the paths from voters to MEPs in comparative perspective between Member States. ${ }^{4}$ Member States are discussed in the alphabetical order of their two-letter codes because the latter are language-independent. ${ }^{5}$

Section 2 sets out with an overview of general aspects of how seats are allocated between Member States (Section 2.1), how seats are apportioned among parties (Section 2.2), and how seats are assigned to candidates (Section 2.3). As political work in the EP is carried out by a few Political Groups rather than by the plethora of the political parties of the MemberStates,Section 2.4 lists the Political Groups in the EP, at the time of the constitution of the new Parliament on 2 July 2019. Incorporation of the Political Groups enables a united view of the otherwise diverse elections, true to the Union's motto of 'United in diversity'.

[^0]Section 3 is the data section. For every Member State we present some descriptive data, the transition from votes to seats, and the assignment of seats to candidates (Section 3.1-3.28).

Section 4 adjoins a hypothetical assessment how the Union-wide votes that areaccumulated by the Political Groups relate to the Union-wide seats with which the Political Groups finished under the current Election Act. ${ }^{6}$

Section 5 concludes the study, which has its focus on quantitative aspects, with some remarks of a more qualitative nature.

References are compiled in Section6. Acronyms, country codes, party tabs and source links are listed in an appendix (Section 7).

As a supplement to this study we generated the site www.uni-augsburg.de/bazi/EP2019Ballots.html which exhibits facsimiles of ballot sheets, ballot papers, ballot booklets, and ballot interfaces from the 2019 elections. The variety of designs illustrates the challenge of achieving a broaderalignment of electoral procedures at future EP elections.

[^1]
## 2. From votes to seats, and from seats to MEPs

The Treaty on European Union stipulates that the EP shall be composed of representatives of the Union's citizens and that representation of citizens shall be degressively proportional (Article 14(2)). The passage from citizens to representatives may be divided into three phases:

- the allocation of all EP seats between the Member States (Section 2.1),
- the apportionment of the seat contingent of a Member State among its domestic parties (Section 2.2), and
- the assignment of the seats of a party to its candidates (Section 2.3).

The phases include many particulars specified by domestic provisions in terms and wordings to which the particular Member State is accustomed. The following review merges these diverse formulations into a uniform terminology, in order to prepare for a comparative presentation of the electoral systems of the Member States in Section 3.

### 2.1. Allocation of seats between Member States

The composition of the ninth EP - i.e. the allocation of all seats between the Union's Member States on the basis of population figures - was troubled by two issues.

The first problem originated from primary law's stipulation that the Union's citizens shall be represented degressively. This very sensitive question had been a recurrent theme on the political agenda. ${ }^{7}$ Since the composition of the previous eighth EP had failed to achieve degressive representation fully, some action was deemed necessary to rectify the deficiency in the ninth EP.

The second question was what to do following the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the EU at which point in time the seventy-three UK seats would fall vacant.

The negotiated solution was a compromise addressing bothissues. ${ }^{8}$ Up until the withdrawal of the UK from the EU, the ninth EP would carry on with the composition of the previous eighth EP, notwithstanding its non-degressivity. Upon the UK's withdrawal, twenty-seven of the vacated UK seats would be employed to achieve full degressivity, by raising the seat contingents of some Member States and maintaining the status quo for the others.

The Member States whose seat contingents increase are ES and FR (each by five seats), IT and NL (three), IE (two), and AT, DK, EE, FI, HR, PL, RO, SE and SK (one). The increments are visualised by explicit plus-signs ' + ' in Table 2.3.1 and Section 3.

[^2]
### 2.2. Apportionment of seats among parties

Article 1 of the 2002 Election Act reads as follows: 'In each Member State, members of the European Parliament shall be elected on the basis of proportional representation, using the list system or the single transferable vote.' The current section specifies the arithmetical procedures decreed by the Member States in order to realise the proportional representation imperative. Section 2.3 describes the list systems and single transferable vote (STV) schemes used in greater detail, together with their accompanying vote patterns.

Proportional representation systems often set an electoral threshold, i.e. a minimum number of votes a party must get in order to participate in the seat apportionment process. Eleven Member States refrain from imposing an electoral threshold ( $B E, D E, D K, E E, E S, F I, I E, L U, M T, P T, U K$ ).

When a threshold is set, it is usually defined as a percentage relative to the total number of valid votes. Occasionally, the percentage is referred to the total number of votes cast, i.e. the sum of valid votes plus blank votes (where applicable) plus invalid votes. Article 3 of the 2002 Election Act states that the threshold may not exceed five per cent of votes cast.

Thirteen Member States define the threshold to be a percentage of valid votes (AT 4\%, CY $1.8 \%$, CZ 5\%, EL 3\%, FR 5\%, HR 5\%, HU 5\%, IT 4\%, PL 5\%, RO 5\%, SE 4\%, SI 4\%, SK 5\%). Two Member States refer the percentages to the number of votes cast (LT 5\%, LV 5\%). Two Member States (NL, BG) set a quorum threshold. For NL the quorum amounts to $3.8 \%$ of votes cast. For BG the quorum reaches $5.9 \%$ of votes cast and exceeds the five per cent ceiling of the Election Act.

In this study a party passing the electoral threshold is called an apportionment party. In other words the apportionment parties are the parties that participate in the seat apportionment process. A valid vote that is cast for one of the apportionment parties is called an effective vote. Conversely, an ineffective vote is a vote which, although valid, has no role to play in the apportionment calculations; ineffective votes are neglected hereinafter.

Apportionment parties and effective votes by Member State are documented in Section 3. Party names are abbreviated by the party tabs which appear on the internet site election-results.eu and which are reproduced in the appendix (Section 7).

The apportionment of seats among (apportionment) parties proportionally to (effective) votes is accomplished by procedures called apportionment methods. Their history of more than two centuries has providedan abundant supply of procedures. ${ }^{9}$ This abundance is reflected not only by the diversity of methods implemented by the Member States, but also by the diverse descriptions with which one and the same method is specified in different domestic provisions.

For the purpose of comparability we present the apportionment methods in a unified fashion.
In short, every apportionmentmethod operates in two steps.In the first step a party's vote count is scaled down to obtain an interim quotient, by dividing the vote counts of all parties by a common electoral key. In the second step the interim quotient is turned into the seat number sought, by rounding the quotient to a neighbouring whole number.

Either step may be instrumental to ensure that the number of seats handed out becomes exactly equal to the number of seats available. The distinct role played by the two steps is the key to a classification of apportionmentmethods intotwo groups, divisormethods and quota methods.

[^3]A divisor methodapplies a fixed rounding rule in the secondstep and, in order to reach the targeted seat total, invokes flexible electoral keys in the first step. Jargon refers to a flexible electoral key as a divisor, which is why the methods are called divisor methods. From the ensemble of all flexible divisors that reach the targeted seat total we quote in every instance a select divisor which has as many trailing zeros as possible.

Three divisor methods were used at the 2019 elections and will make an appearance in Section 3:
DivDwn Divisor method with downward rounding (AT, BE, CZ, DK, EE, ES, FI, FR, HU, IE, LU, NL, PL, PT, RO, SI, UK): Every vote count is divided by the select divisor; all interim quotients are rounded downwards. This procedure is also known as the method of D'Hondt, Hagenbach-Bischoffor Jefferson.

DivStd Divisor method with standard rounding (DE, LV): Every vote count is divided by the select divisor; an interim quotient is rounded downwards or upwards according to whether its fractional part is smaller or larger than one half. This procedure is also known as the method of Sainte-Laguë, Schepers or Webster.

Div0.6 Swedish modification of the divisor method with standard rounding (SE): Every vote count is divided by the select divisor; an interim quotient smaller than one is rounded downwards or upwards according to whether it is smaller or larger than 0.6 , and every other quotient is rounded downwards or upwards according to whether its fractional part is smaller or larger than one half.

The second group of apportionment methods are quota methods. A quota method uses a fixed electoral key in the first, scaling step and, in order to match the given seat total, invokes flexible splitpoints in the second, rounding step. Jargon refers to a fixed electoral key as a quota, thereby justifying the term quota methods. From the ensemble of all split-points that accomplish thefitting in the rounding step we quote in each case a select split which has as few decimal digits as possible.

Six quota methods were used at the 2019 elections and will make an appearance in Section 3. Five of them rely on the Hare-quota and its variants. The proper Hare-quota ( HaQ ) is the ratio of effective votes relative to seats. When the Hare-quota is rounded downwards its variant-1 (HQ1) is obtained, when it is rounded upwards, variant-2 (HQ2). Variant-3 (HQ3) is the integer part of the ratio of valid votes (i.e. effective votes plus ineffective votes) to seats.

HaQgrR Hare-quota method with fit by greatest remainders (BG, NL, PL): Every vote count is divided by the Hare-quota; an interim quotient is rounded downwards or upwards according to whether its fractional part is smaller or larger than the select split. This procedure is also known as the method of largest remainders, or method of Hare, Niemeyer, Hamilton.

HQ1grR Hare-quota variant-1 method with fit by greatest remainders (IT): Every vote count is divided by the Hare-quota variant-1; an interim quotient is rounded downwards or upwards according to whether its fractional part is smaller or larger than the select split.

HQ2grR Hare-quota variant-2 method with fit by greatest remainders (LT): Every vote count is divided by the Hare-quota variant-2; an interim quotient is rounded downwards or upwards according to whether its fractional part is smaller or larger than the select split.

HQ3grR Hare-quota variant-3 method with fit by greatest remainders (CY): Every vote count is divided by the Hare-quota variant-3; an interim quotient is rounded downwards or upwards according to whether its fractional part is smaller or larger than the select split.

HQ3-EL Hare-quota variant-3 method with Greek fit (EL): Every vote count is divided by the Hare-quota variant-3; the interim quotients are evaluated as in Greece (Section 3.9).

DQ3grR Droop-quota variant-3 method with fit by greatestremainders (SK): Every votecount is divided by the Droop-quota variant-3; an interim quotient is rounded downwards or upwards according to whether its remainder is smaller or larger than the select split.

The last method involves a variant of the Droop-quota. The proper Droop-quota is the downward rounding of $(V /(S+1))+1$, where $V$ is the sum of all effective votes and $S$ is the seat total. Its variant- 3 (DQ3) is the standard rounding ofV/(S+1). The proper Droop-quota itself is used in STV schemes.

STV schemes ask voters to mark on the ballot sheet their preference order of the candidates. A candidate whose tally of top preferences (first preferences in the first count, first plus lower-order preferences in later counts) meets or exceeds the Droop-quota is assigned a seat. Surplus ballots in excess of the quota as well as ballots of eliminated lower ranked candidates are transferred to the remaining candidates for second and subsequent counts. Two transfer strategies were employedat the 2019 elections:

STVran STV scheme with random transfers (IE, MT): Surplus ballots and ballots of eliminated candidates are selected for transfer through a random mechanism.

STVfra STV scheme with fractional transfers (Northern Ireland district of UK): Surplus ballots and ballots of eliminated candidates are transferred through a fractional mechanism.

When the STV results are lifted from the level of candidates to the level of parties, it transpires that the schemes equip the parties with seat contingents which conform to thegoal of the proportional representation ideal, see the final paragraphs in Sections 3.15 (IE) and 3.20 (MT).

Terms such as vote totals and seat totals depend on the electoral area where the aggregation into totals takes place. At the 2019 elections twenty-two Member States treated their territory as a single electoral constituency.

Three Member States established multiple constituencies and evaluated the electoral results separately within each of them, i.e. without consideration of state-wide totals. BE established 3 constituencies, IE 3, UK 12. To this end the state-wide seat contingent was allotted to constituencies well ahead of the May 2019 elections.

Another three Member States subdivided their territory into two or more electoral districts. DE is subdivided into 16 districts, IT 5, PL 13. These states apportioned their state-wide seats in a two-tier process. The initial tier, called super-apportionment, is the apportionment of the state-wide seat contingent among the state's apportionment parties, without any regard to the district-wise subdivision. The second tier, called sub-apportionment, comprises, for each party separately, the apportionment of the party's overall seats among its various district-lists of candidates.

A two-tier process with super-apportionment and sub-apportionments also evolves in the presence of list alliances. At the 2019 elections, only DK featured list alliances (4).

The ways in which party votes are determined are contingent on the ballot design and vote pattern with which voters can express their will. These particulars of a voting system also constitute the core elements when in the end identifying successful candidates and assigning seats to them.

### 2.3. Assignment of seats to candidates

Article 1 of the 2002 Election Act leaves it to the Member States whether to realise the proportional representation principle by means of a list system or an STV scheme. Twenty-five Member States choose a list system, IE and MT implement STV schemes, and the UK makes use of both.

The classification of a voting system as a list system has a generic character calling for further specification. In a system with closed lists, voters can only vote for a list of candidates of a party, without the possibility to change the order of candidates on the list. In systems with semi-open lists, voters vote for a party's list of candidates and, optionally, may add one or more preference votes to express their particular support for some of the candidates. In systems with open lists, the lists simply serve as a menu of names presented in alphabetical order, reverse alphabetical order, random order, or any other arbitrary order. Voters are free to select the candidate whom they wish to support. Some systems grant each voter multiple votes with the option to cast the votes for candidates of different parties (panachage).

A related design allows a vote to be cast for a candidate as a person. Only thereafter, implied by the candidates' affiliation with a particular party, the vote is credited towards the vote tally of the candidate's party. This design puts a demonstrative emphasis on the personalisation component of an election. Another option of honouring the personalisation aspect is provided by STV schemes.In yet other instances candidates are independent and contest the election without affiliation to any of the domestic parties.

The role of parties in list systems needs to be viewed with care. Strictly speaking votes are cast in favour of a list of candidates rather than in favour of a party. In many instances lists and parties are in a one-to-one correspondence, and using the terms list and party synonymously is unambiguous. In other instances several parties team up and together present a joint list of candidates. In these cases the term party refers to a coalition of parties andtheir joint candidate list.

To account for the manifold designs of voting systems we distinguish in the sequel between two vote patterns, list votes and candidate votes. The term list vote (LV) indicates that the vote is cast in the first place for a list of candidates, notwithstanding the possibility that the voting system may grant voters additional preference votes to express their particular support for some of the candidates. The term candidate vote (CV) is used when voters must vote for a person, the attribution to a party being implied only through the person's party affiliation.

Vote pattern LV0 designates a list system with closed lists. Citizens vote for a list of candidates and are granted no (zero) preference votes. The seats are assigned to the top-ranked candidates on the lists. This is the preferred pattern in larger Member States ( $\mathrm{DE}, \mathrm{ES}, \mathrm{FR}, \mathrm{HU}, \mathrm{PT}, \mathrm{RO}, \mathrm{UK}$ ).

Vote patterns LV1, LV2 and LVm are used for list systems with semi-open lists. With vote pattern LV1, citizens not only vote for a list of candidates, but may adjoin up to one preference vote (AT, BG, HR, NL, SE, SI). With vote pattern LV2, up to two preference votes are permitted (CZ, SK). Vote pattern LVm allows multiple preference votes, how many is at the discretion of the voters (BE).

For voting systems with semi-open lists domestic provisions include a bypass rule specifying when a candidate's preference votes tally lets her or him bypass the preordained rank-order on the official party-list. There are two types of bypass rules. A percentage bypass rule requires the candidate's preference votes to meet or exceed a certain percentage of the party's vote total (AT 5\%, BG 15\%, HR 10\%, SE 5\%). A quorum bypass rule defines a quorum of one sort or another that preference votes must reach for a candidate to be placed top (BE,NL, SI). When several candidates succeed to overcome the bypass hurdle they are ranked by their preference votes tallies in decreasing order.

Vote patterns 1CV, 2CV, 3CV, 4CV, 5CV, 6CV, mCV cover voting systems with open lists. They allow every voter to cast votes for up to $1,2,3,4,5,6$ or more candidates of the same party, with the implied consequence that this party is considered to be the voter's party of choice. The seats of a party are assigned to those candidates who rank top in terms of their preference votes tally. Four Member States permit just one candidate vote (1CV:DK, EE, FI, PL). Six Member States allow two or more candidate votes (2CV:CY;3CV:IT;4CV:EL;5CV:LT;mCV:LV). In LU voters can vote for up to six candidates (6CV) who may belong to different parties.

Vote pattern STV is peculiar to STV schemes.Every voter indicates his or her preference order of the candidates on the ballot sheet, in terms of first preference, second preference, etc.

Table 2.3.1 provides an overview of essential structural information of the 2019 European elections. Detailed results per Member State follow in Section 3.

Table 2.3.1: Structural data, 2019 European elections.

| Section |  | Member State | Seat Contingent upon Withdrawal of the UK |  |  | Electoral Threshold | Apportionment Method | Vote Pattem |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | before |  | after |  |  |  |
| 3.1 | AT |  | Austria | 18 | +1 | 19 | 4\% of valid votes | DivDwn | LV1 |
| 3.2 | BE | ${ }^{\text {abelgium*3 }}$ | 21 |  | 21 | none | DivDwn | LVm |
| 3.3 | BG | Bulgaria | 17 |  | 17 | $5.7 \%$ of votes cast | HaQgrR | LV1 |
| 3.4 | CY | Cyprus | 6 |  | 6 | $1.8 \%$ of valid votes | HQ3grR | 2CV |
| 3.5 | CZ | Czechia | 21 |  | 21 | $5 \%$ of valid votes | DivDwn | LV2 |
| 3.6 | DE | ${ }^{\text {b }}$ Germany/16 | 96 |  | 96 | none | DivStd | LV0 |
| 3.7 | DK | ${ }^{\text {'Denmark+4 }}$ | 13 | +1 | 14 | none | DivDwn | 1CV |
| 3.8 | EE | Estonia | 6 | +1 | 7 | none | DivDwn | 1CV |
| 3.9 | EL | Greece | 21 |  | 21 | $3 \%$ of valid votes | HQ3-EL | 4CV |
| 3.10 | ES | Spain | 54 | +5 | 59 | none | DivDwn | LV0 |
| 3.11 | Fl | Finland | 13 | +1 | 14 | none | DivDwn | 1CV |
| 3.12 | FR | France | 74 | +5 | 79 | 5\% of valid votes | DivDwn | LV0 |
| 3.13 | HR | Croatia | 11 | +1 | 12 | $5 \%$ of valid votes | DivDwn | LV1 |
| 3.14 | HU | Hungary | 21 |  | 21 | 5\% of valid votes | DivDwn | LV0 |
| 3.15 | IE | ${ }^{\text {a }}$ reland*3 | 11 | +2 | 13 | none | STVran | STV |
| 3.16 | IT | b,dItaly/5 | 73 | +3 | 76 | 4\% of valid votes | HQ1grR, HQ1 ${ }^{\text {grR }}$ | 3CV |
| 3.17 | LT | Lithuania | 11 |  | 11 | $5 \%$ of votes cast | HQ2grR | 5CV |
| 3.18 | LU | Luxembourg | 6 |  | 6 | none | DivDwn | 6CV |
| 3.19 | LV | Latvia | 8 |  | 8 | $5 \%$ of votes cast | DivStd | mCV |
| 3.20 | MT | Malta | 6 |  | 6 | none | STVran | STV |
| 3.21 | NL | Netherlands | 26 | +3 | 29 | $3.8 \%$ of votes cast | DivDwn | LV1 |
| 3.22 | PL | ${ }^{\text {b }}$ Poland/13 | 51 | +1 | 52 | $5 \%$ of valid votes | DivDwn, HaQgrR | 1CV |
| 3.23 | PT | Portugal | 21 |  | 21 | none | DivDwn | LV0 |
| 3.24 | RO | Romania | 32 | +1 | 33 | $5 \%$ of valid votes | DivDwn | LV0 |
| 3.25 | SE | Sweden | 20 | +1 | 21 | $4 \%$ of valid votes | Div0.6 | LV1 |
| 3.26 | SI | Slovenia | 8 |  | 8 | 4\% of valid votes | DivDwn | LV1 |
| 3.27 | SK | Slovakia | 13 | +1 | 14 | 5\% of valid votes | DQ3grR | LV2 |
| 3.28 | UK | aUnited <br> Kingdom*12 | 73 | -73 | - | none | DivDwn, STVfra | LVO, STV |
| Sum |  |  | 751 | $73+27$ | 705 |  |  |  |

${ }^{\text {a }}$ ) Belgium*3 indicating that Belgium establishes 3 constituencies (similarly: Ireland*3, United Kingdom*12).
${ }^{\text {b }}$ ) Germany/16 indicating that Germany subdivides its area into 16 districts (similarly: Italy/5, Poland/13).
${ }^{\text {c }}$ ) Denmark+4 indicating that Denmark features 4 list alliances.
${ }^{\text {d }}$ ) Italian district sub-apportionments are adjusted so as to match the state-wide super-apportionment.

### 2.4. Political Groups in the new European Parliament

While MEPs are assigned parliamentary seats via home states and domestic parties, of which there are plenty, parliamentary business in the EP is organised by Political Groups. At the time of writing, there were seven Political Groups, plus non-attached MEPs who did not join any of the Political Groups. The latter are referred to as NI (non-attached MEPs, from the French non-inscrits).

Table 2.4.1 shows the Political Groups in the EP that formed at the constitutive session on 2 July 2019. The then house size was 748 seats since three Spanish MEPs were barred from taking their seats due to pending litigation.

Table 2.4.1: Political Groups in the EP, constitutive session on 2 July 2019.

| Acronym | PoliticalGroup | Size |
| :--- | :--- | ---: |
| EPP | Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats) | 182 |
| S\&D | Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the EP | 154 |
| Renew Europe | Renew Europe Group | 108 |
| Greens/EFA | Group of the Greens/ European Free Alliance | 74 |
| ID | Identity and Democracy Group | 73 |
| ECR | European Conservatives and Reformists Group | 62 |
| GUE/NGL | Confederal Group of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left | 41 |
| NI | Non-attached Members | 54 |
| Sum |  | $\mathbf{7 4 8}$ |

Section 3 documents the attachment of MEPs to one of the Political Groups or to NI.
In the majority of cases all MEPs of a domestic party join the same Political Group. In these cases we add the Political Group to the line showing the party name in the tables 'From votes to seats' (i.e. the second of the triplet tables devoted to a Member State).

In some instances MEPs of a party become members of different groups (DE, ES, NL, PL, SK). In these instances we mention the Political Group in thetables 'From seats to MEPs' (i.e. the third of the three tables).

For every Member State the first table 'Base data' collects some basic information, such as number of seats to be filled, size of the electorate, number of votes (votes cast, valid votes, effective votesas applicable), vote pattern, number of parties contesting the election and number of parties participating in the seat apportionment process, gender distribution, etc. Since the Member States' electoral systems are so different we do not enforce an identical template for the base data, but rather confine the tables to the data pertinent for the particular MemberState under review.

## 3. The 2019 elections, by Member State

### 3.1. AT - Republic of Austria

Austria has a contingent of eighteen seats, which was raised by one seat after the UK left the EU. Seven parties campaigned at the election. Parties mustsubmit their list of candidates to the Federal Election Authority at the latest by 5 p.m. on the forty-fourth day before election day. A party-list contains a maximum of forty-two candidates.

On the ballot sheet a voter may mark a party (a list vote), or a party's candidate (a preference vote), or both. When marking both, a party and a candidate, the candidate marked must belong to the party marked, otherwise the ballot is invalid. A preference vote is expressed on the ballot sheet by writing into a designated box either the candidate's last name, or the candidate's reference number in the party-list.

Table 3.1.1: Austria, base data.

| EP2019AT-1 |  |
| :--- | :--- |
| Seat contingent | $18+1$ |
| Electorate | 6416177 |
| Constituencies | 1 |
| Vote pattern | LV1 |
| Valid votes | 3779764 |
| Parties admitted | 7 |
| Electoral threshold | 151191 ( $=4 \%$ of valid votes) |
| Apportionment parties | 5 |
| Effective party votes | 3710438 |
| Apportionment method | DivDwn |
| Preference vote hurdle | $5 \%$ bypass rule |
| Candidates admitted | 119 female +145 male $=264$ |
| MEPs gender | 9 female +9 male $=18$ |

There is an electoral threshold of four per cent of the valid votes. Thus a party participates in the seat apportionment process only when garnering 151191 votes or more (since four per cent of 3779764 equals 151 190.56). Two parties failed the threshold, leaving five apportionment parties.

The apportionment of the contingent of eighteen seats is carried out using the divisor method with downward rounding (DivDwn). Every 180000 votes justify roughly ${ }^{10}$ one seat. The values of the interim quotients indicate that the next, nineteenth seat will be apportioned to GRÜNE (divisor 170000).

Table 3.1.2: Austria, from votes to seats.

| EP2019AT-2 | Votes | Quotient <br> [Divisor] | Seats <br> (DivDwn) | Political <br> Group |
| :--- | ---: | :---: | :---: | :--- |
| ÖVP | 1305956 | 7.3 | 7 | EPP |
| SPÖ | 903151 | 5.02 | 5 | S\&D |
| FPÖ | 650114 | 3.6 | 3 | ID |
| GRÜNE | 532193 | 2.96 | $2+1$ | Greens/EFA |
| NEOS | 319024 | 1.8 | 1 | Renew Europe |
| Sum | $\mathbf{3 7 1 0 4 3 8}$ | $[\mathbf{1 8 0} \mathbf{0 0 0}]$ | $\mathbf{1 8 + 1}$ |  |

[^4]The seats apportioned to a party are assigned to its candidates following the rank-order on the party-list, except that a candidate bypasses the order when satisfying a five per cent bypass rule. The bypass rule demands a candidate's preference votes tally to meet or exceed five per cent of the party's vote total. When the rule is satisfied the candidate advances to the top of the list irrespective of the initial list place.

In 2019 nine candidates were elected due to their preference vote tallies. Two of them resigned promptly and did not take their seats. The list places of these candidates were not decisive for the seat assignment, yet a favourable placement may havebeen conducive for them to acquire so many preference votes. In Table 3.1.3 the list places of these candidates are crossed out. The other MEPs got a seat on the grounds of their rank-place on the party-list, not on the grounds of their preference votes tallies. This is indicated in Table 3.1.3 by crossing out their preference vote tallies.

Table3.1.3: Austria, from seats to MEPs.

| EP2019AT-3 | List Plac e | Preferenc <br> e <br> Votes |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| ÖVP (Bypass hurdle: $5 \%$ of $1305956=$65 298) |  |  |
| 1. Karoline EDTSTADLER | z | 115906 |
| 2. Othmar Karas | 7 | 103035 |
| 3. Angelika WINzIG | 3 | 85031 |
| 4. Simone Schmiedtbauer | 4 | 64240 |
| 5. Lukas MANDL | 5 | 38605 |
| 6. ${ }^{\text {a }}$ Barbara THALER | 8 | 38285 |
| 7. Alexander Bernhuber | 11 | 30338 |
| SPÖ45 158) $\quad$ (Bypass hurdle: $5 \%$ of $903151=$ |  |  |
| 1. Andreas SCHIEDER |  | 72863 |
| 2. Evelyn ReGner | 2 | 12089 |
| 3. Günther SIDL | 3 | 8427 |
| 4. Bettina Vollath | 4 | 7738 |
| 5. Hannes Helde | 5 | 12455 |
| FPÖ (Bypass hurdle: $5 \%$ of $650114=$32506 ) |  |  |
| 1. Harald VILIMSKY | 7 | 64525 |
| 2. ${ }^{\text {b }}$ Petra STEGER | 3 | 3380 |
| 3. Georg MAYER | 2 | 2514 |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { GRÜNE (Bypass hurdle: } 5 \% \text { of } 532193= \\ & 26610 \text { ) } \end{aligned}$ |  |  |
| 1. ${ }^{\text {c Monika VANA }}$ | 3 | 6569 |
| 2. Sarah Wiener | z | 35741 |
| +3. Thomas Waitz | 4 | 4742 |
| NEOS (Bypass hurdle: $5 \%$ of $319024=$15952 ) |  |  |
| 1. Claudia Gamon | 7 | 64341 |

${ }^{\text {a }}$ ) List places 6, 7 and 9, 10 resigning in favour of preference votes ranking. ${ }^{\text {b }}$ ) Petra SteGER incoming for Heinz-Christian STRACHE (44 751 preference votes, list place 42).
${ }^{\text {c }}$ ) Monika VANA incoming for Werner Kogler (70 821 preference votes, list place 4).

### 3.2. BE - Kingdom of Belgium

Belgium is allocated a contingent of twenty-one seats. Candidates had to be nominated by the fiftyseventh day prior to the election. A total of 316 candidates were named. There were 148 female candidates and 168 male candidates.

On the ballot sheets voters may mark a party (a list vote), or one candidate or more from the same party (preference votes), or both. When no party is marked the ballot is attributed to the party to which the preference candidates belong. When no candidate is marked the ballot is considered to express support for the party-list as is.

Table 3.2.1: Belgium, base data.

| EP2019BE-1 |  |
| :--- | :--- |
| Seat contingent | 21 |
| Electorate | 8122985 |
| Constituencies | 3 |
| Vote pattern | LVm |
| Electoral threshold | none |
| Apportionment parties | 22 |
| Effective party votes | 6732157 |
| Apportionment method | DivDwn |
| Preference vote hurdle | Quorum bypass rule |
| Candidates admitted | 148 female +168 male $=316$ |
| MEPs gender | 8 female +13 male $=21$ |

Domestic provisions establish threeconstituencies for separate evaluation of electoral results:

1. Dutch Electoral College -12 seats,
2. French Electoral College - 8 seats,
3. German Language Community - 1 seat.

There is no electoral threshold. Seats areapportioned among parties using the divisor method with downward rounding (DivDwn), in each constituency separately. In the Dutch Electoral College every 270000 votes justify roughly one seat, in the French Electoral College, 218 000, and in the German Language Community, 10000.

Table 3.2.2: Belgium, from votes to seats.

| EP2019BE-2 | Votes | Quotient <br> [Divisor] | Seats <br> (DivDwn) | Political <br> Group |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :--- |
|  | 1. Dutch Electoral College |  |  |  |
| N-VA | 954048 | 3.5 | 3 | ECR |
| VLAAMS BELANG | 811169 | 3.004 | 3 | ID |
| Open VId | 678051 | 2.5 | 2 | Renew Europe |
| CD\&V | 617651 | 2.3 | 2 | EPP |
| GROEN | 525908 | 1.9 | 1 | Greens/EFA |
| sp.a | 434002 | 1.6 | 1 | S\&D |
| 2 Others | 230776 | - | 0 |  |
| Sum | $\mathbf{4 2 5 1 6 0 5}$ | [270 000] | $\mathbf{1 2}$ |  |
|  | $\mathbf{2 . F r e n c h}$ | Electoral College |  |  |
| PS | 651157 | 2.99 | 2 | S\&D |
| ECOLO | 485655 | 2.2 | 2 | Greens/EFA |
| MR | 470654 | 2.2 | 2 | Renew Europe |
| PTB | 355883 | 1.6 | 1 | GUE/NGL |
| CDH | 218078 | 1.004 | 1 | EPP |
| 2 Others | 258348 | - | 0 |  |
| Sum | $\mathbf{2 4 3 9} 775$ | $[\mathbf{2 1 8} \mathbf{0 0 0 ]}$ | $\mathbf{8}$ |  |


| 3. German Language Community |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| CSP | 14.247 | 1,4 | 1 | EPP |
| 6 Others | 26530 | - | 0 |  |
| Sum | $\mathbf{4 0 7 7 7}$ | $\mathbf{[ 1 0} \mathbf{0 0 0}]$ | $\mathbf{1}$ |  |

The assignment of seats to candidates relies on a quorum bypass rule. The quorum of a party is the upward rounding of its vote total divided by its seat number plus one (Droop-quota). A candidate with more preference votes than required by the quorum of her or his party is assigned a seat.

In addition, in order to aid the upper echelons on a list to bridge a remaining gap between their preference votes tally and the bypass quorum, the system provides what it calls 'devolution votes'. The number of devolution votes is taken to be half the number of purelist votes, i.e. votes which do not include a preference vote for any of the titular candidates. Presumably it is thought that every second of these voters intends not only to support the party, but also to endorse the sequencing of candidates on the party-list. Devolution votes, one after the other, are dealt out to candidates who rank high on their party-list until their preference votes tally reaches the bypass quorum or the devolution pool is exhausted. The main effect of this action is that the list sequence of candidates, as submitted by party headquarters, is shielded against the ranking by preference vote tallies that are induced by the voters.

For example, in the Dutch Electoral College, party N-VA has bypass quorum 238 512. Geert Bourgeois, list place 1, garners more preference votes and hence is assigned the first seat. Assita KANKo, list place 2, has 85950 preference votes and fails the quorum. From the devolution pool of 246206 votes, 152562 are granted to Kanko. Since the sum of 85950 and 152562 is 238512 , she now meets the quorum and is assigned the second seat. The remaining devolution votes, 246 206$152562=93$ 644, benefit Johan Van Overtveldt on list place 3. His updated tally 198367 still fails the quorum, but outperforms all subsequent candidates on the list. Hence Van Overtveldt is assigned the third seat.

Table 3.2.3: Belgium, from seats to MEPs.

| EP 2019BE-3 | List Place | Preference Votes + Devolution Votes |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1. Dutch Electoral College |  |  |
| N-VA246 206) |  |  |
| 1. Geert Bourgeois | 7 | 343290 |
| 2. Assita Kanko | $z$ | $85950+152562=238512$ |
| 3. Johan Van Overtveldt | 3 | $104723+93644=198367$ |
| VLAAMS BELANG | (Bypass quorum: 202 793; devolution votes: 256 429) |  |
| 1. Gerolf ANNEMANS | 7 | 207054 |
| 2. ${ }^{\text {a }}$ Tom Vandendriessche | substitute | $68871+133922=202793$ |
| 3. Filip De Man | 3 | $58486+105614=164100$ |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Open VId } \\ & 129 \text { 188) } \end{aligned}$ | (Bypass quorum: 226 017; devolution votes: |  |
| 1. Guy Verhofstadt | 7 | 342460 |
| 2. Hilde Vautmans | 2 | $63225+129188=192413$ |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { CD\&V } \\ & 126059) \end{aligned}$ | (Bypass quorum: 205 884; devolution votes: |  |
| 1. Kris Peeters | 7 | 256822 |
| 2. Cindy Frannsen | 2 | $50014+126059=176073$ |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { GROEN } \\ & 145957) \end{aligned}$ | (Bypass quorum: 262 954; devolution votes: |  |
| 1.Petra De Sutter | 4 | $143377+119577$ = 262954 |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { sp.a } \\ & 116 \text { 481) } \end{aligned}$ | (Bypass quorum: 217 001; devolution votes: |  |
| 1. Kathleen Van Brempt | 7 | $127053+89948=217001$ |


| 2. French Electoral College |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { PS } \\ & 140818) \end{aligned}$ | (Bypass quorum: 217 053; devolution votes: |  |
| 1. ${ }^{\text {b }}$ Marc Tarabella | substitute | $54154+162889=217053$ |
| 2. Maria Arena | 2 | $68981+140818=209799$ |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { ECOLO } \\ & 144273) \end{aligned}$ | (Bypass quorum: 161 885; devolution votes: |  |
| 1. Philippe LAmBERTS | 7 | $115922+45963=161885$ |
| 2. Saskia Bricmont | 2 | $57261+98310=155571$ |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { MR } \\ & 124 \text { 299) } \end{aligned}$ | (Bypass quorum: 156885 ; devolution votes: |  |
| 1. Olivier Chastel | 4 | $123331+33554=156885$ |
| 2. Frédérique RIES | $z$ | $111477+45408=156885$ |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { PTB } \\ & 115 \text { 826) } \end{aligned}$ | (Bypass quorum: 177 942; devolution votes: |  |
| 1. Marc Botenga | 4 | $68033+109909=177942$ |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { CDH } \\ & 49 \text { 132) } \end{aligned}$ | (Bypass quorum: 109 039; devolution votes: |  |
| 1. Benoît LUTGEN | 7 | $95783+13256=109039$ |
| 3. German Language Community |  |  |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { CSP } \\ & 2628) \end{aligned}$ | (Bypass quorum: 7 124; devolution votes: |  |
| 1.Pascal ARIMONT | 7 | 8992 |

${ }^{\text {a) }}$ ) Tom VANDENDRIESSCHE, first on list of substitute candidates, incoming for Patsy VALET (51978+150815=202 793).
${ }^{\text {b }}$ ) Marc TARABELLA, first substitute candidate, incoming for Paul MAGNETTE (295 339 preference votes, list place 1).

### 3.3. BG - Republic of Bulgaria

Bulgaria is allocated a contingent of seventeen seats. Twenty-one parties and six independent candidates were admitted at the election. A party-list may contain no more than seventeen candidates. The registration of the candidate lists had to be effected not later than 32 days in advance of polling day. Altogether 318 candidates were admitted to the election.

On the ballot sheets voters mark either a party (a list vote) or an independent candidate. When casting a list vote, a voter may adjoin a preference vote by ticking a box with a numeral $1,2, \ldots, 17$, thereby endorsing the nominee who has this rank on the marked list.

There is a quorum electoral threshold applying to parties as well as to independent candidates. The threshold is the valid votes-to-seats ratio and equals 118548 votes (as 2015314 / $17=118$ 547.88). The threshold exceeds five per cent of votes cast (since $118548 / 2095561=5.7$ per cent), thus violating Art. 3 of the 2002 Electoral Act. Five parties passed the threshold, but no independent candidates did.

Table 3.3.1: Bulgaria, base data.

| EP2019BG-1 |  |
| :--- | :--- |
| Seat contingent | 17 |
| Electorate | 6838863 |
| Constituencies | 1 |
| LV1 |  |
| Vote pattern | 2095561 |
| Valid votes | 2015314 |
| Parties admitted | 21, plus 6 independent candidates |
| Electoral threshold | 118548 (= 5.7\% of votes cast) |
| Apportionment parties | 4 parties plus 1 coalition |
| Effective party votes | 1667178 |
| Apportionment method | HaQgrR |
| Preference vote hurdle | $15 \%$ bypass rule |
| Candidates admitted | 93 female +225 male $=318$ |
| MEPs gender | 5 female +12 male $=17$ |

The seat apportionment is carried out using the Hare-quota method with fit by greatestremainders (HaQgrR). The Hare-quota is the effective votes-to-seats ratio, $1667178 / 17=98069.29$. That is, every 98069.29 shares of vote justify roughly one seat. Interim quotients with a remainder below the split .4 are rounded downwards. With a remainder above the split .4 they are rounded upwards.

Table 3.3.2: Bulgaria, from votes to seats.

| EP2019BG-2 | Votes | Quotient <br> [Split] | Seats <br> (HaQgri) | Political <br> Group |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :--- |
| Coal. GERB | 607194 | 6.2 | 6 | EPP |
| BSP | 474160 | 4.8 | 5 | S\&D |
| DPS | 323510 | 3.3 | 3 | Renew Europe |
| VMRO | 143830 | 1.5 | 2 | ECR |
| Demokratichna Bulgaria | 118484 | 1.2 | 1 | EPP |
| Sum | $\mathbf{1 6 6 7 1 7 8}$ | $[.4]$ | $\mathbf{1 7}$ |  |

The assignment of the seats of a party to its candidates follows the rank-order of the party-list, except for a fifteen per cent bypass rule to honour preference votes. A candidate advances to the
top of the list when his or her preference votes tally meets or exceeds fifteen per cent of the party's votetotal.

The fifteen per cent bypass rule reinforces the standing of the top-listed candidates of BSP, VMRO and Demokratichna Bulgaria. It makes no difference to the seat assignment, though it may please the candidates' kudos.

Table 3.3.3: Bulgaria, from seats to MEPs.

${ }^{\text {a }}$ ) Emil Radev incoming for Мария Иванова ГАБРИЕл (list place 1,82536 preference votes) and Лиляна Павлова ПАвловА (list place 7, 27313 preference votes).
${ }^{\text {b }}$ ) Iskra МінАYLova incoming for Мустафа Сали КАРАДАЙъ (list place 1,12007 preference votes).
${ }^{\text {c }}$ ) Atidzhe AlieVA-VELI incoming for Делян Славчев ПеЕвСКи (list place 2, 6306 preference votes).

### 3.4. CY - Republic of Cyprus

Cyprus is allocated a contingent of six seats. The date of the nomination must be at least seven days prior to the election. Thirteen parties and three independent candidates were admitted at the election. A maximum of six candidates may be listed per party-list.
The ballot sheet format is supportive for voters to cast two candidate votes. Every party occupies a column displaying the names of its candidates, in alphabetical order. A voter may cast one or two candidate votes. If voters mark more than two candidates of the same party, their vote is taken to count towards the party. It is possible to vote just for the party by checking a box that comes last in the column's footline.

Table 3.4.1: Cyprus, base data.

| EP2019CY-1 |  |
| :--- | :--- |
| Seat contingent | 6 |
| Electorate | 641 181 |
| Constituencies | 1 |
| Vote pattern | 2CV |
| Valid votes | 280935 |
| Parties admitted | 13, plus 3 independent candidate |
| Electoral threshold | $5057(=1.8 \%$ of valid votes $)$ |
| Apportionment parties | 7 |
| Effective party votes | 270323 |
| Apportionment method | HQ3grR |
| Candidates admitted | 18 female +60 male $=78$ |
| MEPs gender | 0 female +6 male $=6$ |

There is an electoral threshold of 1.8 per cent of the valid votes ( 5057 votes). Six parties and the three independent candidates miss the threshold, their 10612 votes are discarded. The effective votes (270323) are cast for seven parties. The seat apportionment uses the Hare-quota variant-3 method with fit by greatest remainders (HQ3grR). The Hare-quota variant-3, the valid votes-to-seats ratio without fraction, amounts to 46822 (since $280935 / 6=46822.5$ ). Every 46822 votes justify roughly one seat. Quotients below the split . 6 are rounded downwards, above, upwards.

Table 3.4.2: Cyprus, from votes to seats.

| EP2019CY-2 | Votes | Quotient <br> [Split] | Seats <br> (HQ3grR) | Political <br> Group |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :--- |
| DISY | 81539 | 1.7 | 2 | EPP |
| AKEL | 77241 | 1.65 | 2 | GUE/NGL |
| DIKO | 38756 | 0.8 | 1 | S\&D |
| EDEK | 29715 | 0.63 | 1 | S\&D |
| 3 Others | 43072 | - | 0 |  |
| Sum | $\mathbf{2 7 0 3 2 3}$ | $[.6]$ | $\mathbf{6}$ |  |

The seats of a party are assigned to candidates in the order of preference vote tallies.
Table 3.4.3: Cyprus, from seats to MEPs.

| EP2019CY-3 | Votes | 2. Niyazi KIzILYÜREK | 11606 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| DISY |  | DIKO |  |
| 1.Loukas FOURLAS | 43156 | 1. Costas MAVRIDES | 21155 |
| 2. Lefteris CHRISTOFOROU | 39616 | EDEK |  |
| AKEL |  | 1.Demetris PAPADAKIS | 11789 |
| 1. Giorgos GEORGIOU | 27063 |  |  |

### 3.5. CZ - Czech Republic

Czechia is allocated a contingent of twenty-one seats. Parties, movements or coalitions must present their candidate lists to the Ministry of the Interior no later than sixty-six days prior to election day. A list may exceed the number of MEPs to be elected by one third, i.e. it may include twenty-eight names. Altogether there were 841 candidates. Independent candidacies were not allowed.

Every party, movement or coalition has a ballot sheet of its own. Voters receive a full set of ballot sheets. On the ballot sheet of the party of their choice voters may cast up to two preferential votes for specific candidates. They insert this sheet into an official envelope to go into the ballot box.

Table 3.5.1: Czechia, base data.

| EP2019CZ-1 |  |
| :--- | :--- |
| Seat contingent | 21 |
| Electorate | 8316737 |
| Constituencies | 1 |
| Vote pattern | LV2 |
| Valid votes | 2370765 |
| Parties admitted | 39 |
| Electoral threshold | $118539(=5 \%$ of valid votes $)$ |
| Apportionment parties | 7 |
| Effective party votes | 2007357 |
| Apportionment method | DivDwn |
| Preference vote hurdle | $5 \%$ bypass rule |
| Candidates admitted | 191 female +650 male $=841$ |
| MEPs gender | 7 female +14 male $=21$ |

There is an electoral threshold of five per cent of valid votes. With 2370765 valid votes the threshold amounts to 118539 votes. It is missed by thirty-two parties, leaving seven apportionment parties and coalitions. The seat apportionment is carried out using the divisor method with downward rounding (DivDwn). Every 83000 votes justify roughly one seat.

Table 3.5.2: Czechia, from votes to seats.

| EP2019CZ-2 | Votes | Quotient <br> [Divisor] | Seats <br> (DivDwn) | Political <br> Group |
| :--- | ---: | :---: | :---: | :--- |
| ANO 2011 | 502343 | 6.1 | 6 | Renew Europe |
| ODS | 344885 | 4.2 | 4 | ECR |
| Piráti | 330844 | 3.99 | 3 | Greens/EFA |
| TOP 09 + STAN | 276220 | 3.3 | 3 | EPP |
| SPD | 216718 | 2.6 | 2 | ID |
| KDU-ČSL | 171723 | 2.1 | 2 | EPP |
| KSČM | 164624 | 1.98 | 1 | GUE/NGL |
| Sum | $\mathbf{2 0 0 7 3 5 7}$ | [83 000] | $\mathbf{2 1}$ |  |

The seats of a party are assigned to its list nominees in the order exhibited in the list. However, a candidate bypasses the rank-order of the list and advances to the top when the number of his or her preference votes meets or exceeds five per cent of the total of the party's votes.

Table 3.5.3: Czechia, from seats to MEPs.


### 3.6. DE - Federal Republic of Germany

Germany has ninety-six seats to fill. Election proposals must be presented to the Federal Election Officer by the eighty-third day prior to the election. Independent candidates are not admitted.

Germany divides its area into sixteen electoral districts identical to the sixteen states of the federation. Parties may register a single federal list, or separate lists by district. All parties with the exception of CDU and CSU registered a single party-list valid for the whole country. The CSU registered a list just for the one district in which they campaigned (Bavaria). The CDU chose to submit separate lists for each of the fifteen districts where the party stood (all districts except Bavaria). Forty-one parties were admitted at the election, with a total of 1399 candidates.

Ballot papers vary across the sixteen districts due to distinct district-lists of CDU and CSU. The first ten (or fewer when enforced by lack of space) names of every list are printed on the ballot sheet. Every voter has one vote to mark the party of her or his choice. There is no electoral threshold.

Table 3.6.1: Germany, base data.

| EP2019DE-1 |  |
| :--- | :--- |
| Seat contingent | 96 |
| Electorate | 61600263 |
| Electoral districts | 16 |
| Vote pattern | LV0 |
| Electoral threshold | none |
| Apportionment parties | 41 |
| Effective party votes | 37396889 |
| Apportionment method | DivStd, DivStd |
| Candidates admitted | 483 female +915 male +1 divers= 1399 |
| MEPs gender | 35 female +61 male $=96$ |

The apportionment of seats among parties is a two-tier process due to the fifteen CDU district lists. Both tiers employ the divisor method with standard rounding (DivStd). The super-apportionment distributes the contingent of ninety-six seats among all forty-one parties; every 374000 votes justify roughly one seat. Twenty-seven parties are left with no seat.

Table 3.6.2: Germany, from votes to seats.

| EP2019DE-2 | Votes | Quotient [Divisor] | Seats (DivStd) | Political Group |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Super-apportionment of 96 seats among 41 parties |  |  |  |  |
| CDU | 8438975 | 22.6 | 23 | EPP |
| GRÜNE | 7677071 | 20.53 | 21 | Greens/EFA |
| SPD | 5916882 | 15.8 | 16 | S\&D |
| AfD | 4104453 | 11.0 | 11 | ID |
| CSU | 2355067 | 6.3 | 6 | EPP |
| DIE LINKE | 2056049 | 5.497 | 5 | GUE/NGL |
| FDP | 2028594 | 5.4 | 5 | Renew Europe |
| DIE PARTEI | 899079 | 2.4 | 2 | (see Table 3.6.3) |
| FREIE WÄHLER | 806703 | 2.2 | 2 | Renew Europe |
| TIERSCHUTZPARTEI | 542226 | 1.4 | 1 | GUE/NGL |
| ÖDP | 369869 | 1.0 | 1 | Greens/EFA |
| FAMILIE | 273828 | 0.7 | 1 | ECR |
| VOLT | 249098 | 0.7 | 1 | Greens/EFA |
| PIRATEN | 243302 | 0.7 | 1 | Greens/EFA |
| 27 Others | 1435693 | - | 0 |  |
| Sum | 37396889 | [374 000] | 96 |  |

## District

| Votes | Quotient | $\begin{array}{c}\text { Seats } \\ \text { [Divisor }\end{array}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| (DivStd) |  |  |

CDU sub-apportionment of 23 seats among 15 districts

| 1. Schleswig-Holstein | 353020 | 0.9 | 1 |
| :--- | ---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2. Hamburg | 140966 | 0.4 | 0 |
| 3. Niedersachsen | 1119352 | 2.8 | 3 |
| 4. Bremen | 64078 | 0.2 | 0 |
| 5. Nordrhein-Westfalen | 2237590 | 5.6 | 6 |
| 6. Hessen | 657886 | 1.6 | 2 |
| 7. Rheinland-Pfalz | 613470 | 1.53 | 2 |
| 8. Baden-Württemberg | 1499962 | 3.7 | 4 |
| 9. Saarland | 161897 | 0.4 | 0 |
| 10.Berlin | 229352 | 0.6 | 1 |
| 11.Brandenburg | 215523 | 0.54 | 1 |
| 12.Mecklenburg-Vorpommern | 184894 | 0.46 | 0 |
| 13. Sachsen | 474730 | 1.2 | 1 |
| 14. Sachsen-Anhalt | 226438 | 0.6 | 1 |
| 15. Thüringen | 259817 | 0.6 | 1 |
| Sum | $\mathbf{8 4 3 8} 975$ | [400 000] | $\mathbf{2 3}$ |

The CDU sub-apportionmentallots the overall CDU seats (23) among the fifteen CDU district-lists. In the CDU sub-apportionment, every 400000 votes justify roughly one seat.

Germany uses closed list systems. Seats are assigned to candidates in the rigid sequence given by party-lists. One MEP of DIE PARTEI is unattached, the other joins the Greens/EFA group.

Table 3.6.3: Germany, from seats to MEPs.

| EP2019DE-3 | 3. Terry REINTKE | 9. Gabriele BISCHOFF | DIE LINKE |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| CDU | 4. Reinhard Bütikofer | 10. Ismail ERTUG | 1. Martin Schirdewan |
| 1.1. Niclas Herbst | 5. Hannah Neumann | 11. Constanze KREHL | 2. Özlem Demirel |
| 3.1. David MCAlLITER | 6. Martin HäusLING | 12. Tiemo Wölken | 3. Cornelia ERNST |
| 3.2. Jens GIESEKE | 7. Anna Cavazzinı | 13. Petra Kammerevert | 4. Helmut Scholz |
| 3.3. Lena Düpont | 8. Erik Marquardt | 14. Norbert Neuser | 5. Martina Michels |
| 5.1. Peter LIESE | 9. Katrin LANGENsIEPEN | 15.Evelyne Gebhardt | FDP |
| 5.2. Markus PIEPER | 10. Romeo Franz | 16. Joachim SCHUSTER | 1. Nicola Beer |
| 5.3. Sabine Verheyen | 11. Jutta Paulus | AfD | 2. Svenja HAHN |
| 5.4. Axel Voss | 12. Sergey LAGODINSKY | 1. Jörg Meuthen | 3. Andreas Glück |
| 5.5. Dennis Radtke | 13. Henrike HAHN | 2. Guido Rell | 4. Moritz KÖRNER |
| 5.6. Stefan BERGER | 14. Michael BLoss | 3. Maximilian KRaH | 5.Jan-Christoph OEtJen |
| 6.1. Sven SImon | 15.Anna Deparnay-Grunenberg | 4. Lars Patrick Berg | DIE PARTEI |
| 6.2 Michael Gahler | 16. Rasmus Andresen | 5. Bernhard Zımniok | 1.Martin Sonneborn NI |
| 7.1. Christine SCHNEIDER | 17. Alexandra Geese | 6. Nicolaus FEST | 2. Nico Semsrott Greens/EFA |
| 7.2. Ralf SEEKATZ | 18. Niklas Nienass | 7.Markus BuchHeit | FREIE WÄHLER |
| 8.1. Rainer WIELAND | 19. Viola von Cramon-Taubadel | 8. Christine ANDERSON | 1. Ulrike MÜLLER |
| 8.2 Daniel CASPARY | 20. Daniel FREUND | 9. Sylvia LIMMER | 2. Engin Eroglu |
| 8.3. Andreas SChwab | 21.Pierrette Herzberger-Fofana | 10.Gunnar BECK | TIERSCHUTZPARTEI |
| 8.4. Norbert LINS | SPD | 11. Joachim KUHS | 1. Martin Buschmann |
| 10.1. Hildegard Bentele | 1. Katarina Barley | CSU | ÖDP |
| 11.1. Christian EHLER | 2. Udo Bullmann | 1. Manfred WEbER | 1. Klaus Buchner |
| 13.1. Peter Jahr | 3. Maria Noichl | 2.Angelika Niebler | FAMILIE |
| 14.1. Sven Schulze | 4. Jens Geier | 3. Markus Ferber | 1. Helmut Gevking |
| 15.1.Marion Walsmann | 5. Delara Burkhardt | 4. Monika Hohlmeler | VOLT |
| GRÜNE | 6. Bernd Lange | 5. Christian Doleschal | 1. Damian Boeselager |
| 1. Ska Keller | 7. Birgit SIPPEL | 6. Marlene MortLer | PIRATEN |
| 2. Sven GIEGOLD | 8. Dietmar Köster |  | 1.Patrick BREYER |

### 3.7. DK - Kingdom of Denmark

Denmark has a contingent of thirteen seats which was raised by one seat after the UK left the EU. Faroe Islands and Greenland, although part of the kingdom, are not part of the EU, hence they are not included in the electorate. Lists of candidates must be submitted to the Minister for Economic Affairs and the Interior by noon four weeks prior to election day. A list has a maximum limit of twenty candidates. A total of ten parties with 135 candidates were admitted to the elections.

Just one party stood at the election on its own. The other nine parties registered four list alliances, also referred to as election coalitions. List alliances are not in any way indicated on the ballot paper. Voters have one vote with which they may mark a candidate (personal vote) or a party (list vote). There is no access for independent candidates to stand at the election.

Table 3.7.1: Denmark, base data.

| EP2019DK-1 |  |
| :--- | :--- |
| Seat contingent | $13+1$ |
| Electorate | 4237550 |
| Constituencies | 1 |
| Vote pattern | 1 CV |
| Electoral threshold | none |
| Apportionment parties | 10 |
| Effective votes | 2758855 |
| List alliances | 4 |
| Apportionment method | DivDwn, DivDwn |
| Candidates admitted | 50 female +85 male $=135$ |
| MEPs gender | 6 female +7 male $=13$ |

It is Danish customs that a party is designated by a letter with which it appears on the ballot paper. There are four alliances: Alliance $-1=A+F$, Alliance $-2=B+\AA$, Alliance $-3=V+C+I$, and Alliance $-4=$ $\varnothing+\mathrm{N}$. Parties allying at the election may fork when looking for congenial Political Groups. In Alliance-1 the MEPs of A joined the S\&D group, those of F joined the Greens/EFA group. In Alliance3 the MEPs of V are in the Renew Europe group, while the C-MEP joins EPP.

The apportionment method used is the divisormethod with downward rounding (DivDwn), both in the super-apportionment among party and alliances, as well as in the ensuing four subapportionments among the partners of an alliance. In the super-apportionment every 180000 votes justify roughly one seat. The values of the interim quotients indicate that the next, additional seat will be apportioned to Alliance-3 (divisor 170000 ) and, within Alliance-3, to party V (divisor 150000 ).

Table 3.7.2: Denmark, from votes to seats.

| EP2019DK-2 | Votes | Quotient <br> [Divisor] | Seats <br> (DivDwn) | Political <br> Group |
| :--- | ---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Alliance-1 | 957540 | 5.3 | 5 |  |
| Alliance-3 | 879440 | 4.9 | $4+1$ |  |
| Alliance-2 | 370893 | 2.1 | 2 |  |
| O | 296978 | 1.6 | 1 | ID |
| Alliance-4 | 254004 | 1.4 | 1 |  |
| Sum | $\mathbf{2 7 5 8} \mathbf{8 5 5}$ | $[\mathbf{1 8 0} \mathbf{0 0 0 ]}$ | $\mathbf{1 3 + 1}$ |  |


| Party | Votes | Quotient [Divisor] | Seats (DivDwn) | Political Group |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Alliance-1 sub-apportionment |  |  |  |  |
| A | 592645 | 3.5 | 3 | S\&D |
| F | 364895 | 2.1 | 2 | Greens/EFA |
| Sum | 957540 | [180 000] | 5 |  |
| Alliance-2 sub-apportionment |  |  |  |  |
| B | 277929 | 2.8 | 2 | Renew Europe |
| Å | 92964 | 0.9 | 0 | - |
| Sum | 370893 | [100 000] | 2 |  |
| Alliance-3 sub-apportionment |  |  |  |  |
| V | 648203 | 3.8 | 3+1 | Renew Europe |
| C | 170544 | 1.003 | 1 | EPP |
| 1 | 60693 | 0.4 | 0 | - |
| Sum | 879440 | [170 000] | 4+1 |  |
| Alliance-4 sub-apportionment |  |  |  |  |
| $\varnothing$ | 151903 | 1.2 | 1 | GUE/NGL |
| N | 102101 | 0.8 | 0 | - |
| Sum | 254004 | [130 000] | 1 |  |

The presence of alliances causes a discordant seat apportionment. Party O garners twenty-thousand votes more than party B (296978 versus 277 929), but is apportioned fewer seats (one versus two). Without alliances, B would have lost a seat to V.

The seats of a party are assigned to its candidates on the basis of their personal votes.
Table 3.7.3: Denmark, from seats to MEPs.

| EP2019DK-3 | Votes | 2. Kira Marie Peter-Hansen | 15765 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| V (Venstre, Danmarks Liberale Parti) |  | O (Dansk Folkeparti) |  |
| 1. Morten LøKKEGAARD | 207558 | 1. Peter KoFOD | 119408 |
| 2. Søren Gade | 201696 | B (Radikale Venstre) |  |
| 3. Asger Christensen | 31347 | 1. Morten Petersen | 97667 |
| +4. Linea SøGAARD-LIDELL | 24153 | 2. Karen Melchior | 17292 |
| A (Socialdemokratiet) |  | C (Konservativt Folkeparti) |  |
| 1. ${ }^{\text {a }}$ Marianne VIND | 27396 | 1. Pernille Weiss | 80140 |
| 2. Christel SCHALDEMOSE | 65179 | Ø (Enhedslisten - De Rød-Grønne) |  |
| 3. Niels Fuglsang | 29444 | 1. Nikolaj VILLUMSEN | 50567 |
| F (SF - Socialistisk Folkeparti) |  |  |  |
| 1. Margrete AUKEN | 199522 |  |  |
| ${ }^{\text {a }}$ ) Marianne VIND incoming for Jeppe Kofod (188757 personal votes). |  |  |  |

At the 2019 election the practiced vote pattern was 1CV. However, legal provisions allow a party to register its list with the imposition to apply vote patternLV1. In this latter case, the tallies of personal votes would need to satisfy a quorum bypass rule, with the Droop-quota as the quorum, to be placed ahead of the list. Otherwise, the list ranking would be decisive.

### 3.8. EE - Republic of Estonia

Estonia has a contingent of six seats which, after the UK left the EU, was raised by one seat. The nomination of candidates ends on the fiftieth day before election day at 6 p.m. Nine parties and five independent candidates contested the election. The total number of candidates was sixty-six.

Voters cast a vote for a specific candidate by writing the serial number of this candidate on the ballot sheet or by typing it into an electronic device. Sixty-one candidates are affiliated with one of the nine parties, their candidate votes are aggregated per party. Five candidates remain unattached and, in the end, are unsuccessful.

Table 3.8.1: Estonia, base data.

| EP2019EE-1 |  |
| :--- | :--- |
| Seat contingent | $6+1$ |
| Electorate | 885417 |
| Constituencies | 1 |
| Vote pattern | 1 CV |
| Electoral threshold | none |
| Apportionment parties | 9, plus 5 independent candidates |
| Effective votes | 332104 |
| Apportionment method | DivDwn |
| Candidates admitted | 21 female +25 male $=66$ |
| MEPs gender | 2 female +4 male $=6$ |

The seats are apportioned between parties and independent candidates using the divisor method with downward rounding (DivDwn). With six seats, 36000 votes justify roughly one seat. When contemplating the interim quotients' values it becomes visible that the next, seventh seat will be apportioned to the political party Isamaa Erakond (with divisor 30000 ). Four parties gain parliamentary seats, five after the UK left the EU.

Table 3.8.2: Estonia: from votes to seats.

| EP2019EE-2 | Votes | Quotient <br> [Divisor] | Seats <br> (DivDwn) | Political <br> Group |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :--- |
| Eesti Reformierakond | 87160 | 2.4 | 2 | Renew Europe |
| Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Erakond | 77375 | 2.1 | 2 | S\&D |
| Eesti Keskerakond | 47799 | 1.3 | 1 | Renew Europe |
| Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond | 42265 | 1.2 | 1 | ID |
| Isamaa Erakond | 34188 | 0.9 | $0+1$ | EPP |
| 9 Others (4 parties, 5 indep.) | 43317 | - | 0 |  |
| Sum | $\mathbf{3 3 2} \mathbf{1 0 4}$ | [36 000] | $\mathbf{6 + 1}$ |  |

The seats of a party are assigned to its candidates in the sequence of candidates' votetallies.
Table 3.8.3: Estonia, from seats to MEPs.

| EP2019EE-3 | Votes | Eesti Keskerakond |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | :--- | ---: | :---: | :---: |
| Eesti Reformierakond |  |  | 1. Yana Toom |  |  |
| 1. Andrus ANSIP | 41017 | Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond |  |  |  |
| 2. Urmas PAET | 30014 | 1.Jaak MADISON | 22819 |  |  |
| Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Erakond | Isamaa Erakond |  |  |  |  |
| 1. Marina KALURAND | 65549 | +1.Riho TERRAS | 21477 |  |  |
| 2. Sven MIKSER | 2886 |  |  |  |  |

### 3.9. EL - Hellenic Republic

Greece is allocated a contingent of twenty-oneseats. Registration of parties ends on the fiftieth day before election day. Forty parties registered at the election, altogether nominating 1209 candidates. Every party or coalition has its own ballot paper. Voters select the ballot paper of the party of their choice and may express their preferences for up to four of the listed candidates. There is an electoral threshold of three per cent of the valid votes, setting aside thirty-four parties and leaving six apportionment parties.

Table 3.9.1: Greece, base data.

| EP2019EL-1 |  |
| :--- | :--- |
| Seat contingent | 21 |
| Electorate | 10088325 |
| Constituencies | 1 |
| Vote pattern | 4 CV |
| Valid votes | 5656119 |
| Parties admitted | 40 |
| Electoral threshold | 169684 (= 3\% of valid votes) |
| Apportionment parties | 6 |
| Effective votes | 4468 142 |
| Apportionment method | HQ3-EL |
| Candidates admitted | 513 female +696 male $=1209$ |
| MEPs gender | 5 female +16 male $=21$ |

The apportionment of seats among parties is one-of-a-kind, by including the sum of the votes of the forty non-apportionment parties, 1187977 , to concoct a peculiar fitting process. It is in two phases. Phase-1 relies on the Hare-quota variant-3, the integer part of the valid votetotal divided by the seat total, 5656119 / 21 = 269 339. A party's vote total is divided by the quota, and the integer part of the resulting quotient (Quot.-1) signifies the number of seats to be apportioned in Phase-1. Every 269339 votes justify roughly one seat. Phase-1 deals out thirteen seats, leaving eight to be looked after in Phase-2.

Phase-2 refers to the unused voting power (UVP) of the parties. For example, the six Phase- 1 seats for ND use $6 \times 269339=1616034$ votes, leaving $1873137-1616034=257103$ unused votes. The unused voting powers, including the ineffective votes, total 2154712 . This total is divided by the number of residual seats (8) plus one. The integer part of the resulting quotient is 239412 (DQ5, Droop-quota variant-5), it enters into Phase-2. For every party, its unused voting power is divided by 239412 to obtain the second quotients Quot.-2. A party's Phase- 1 seat number is augmented by the integer part of the second quotient (ND: $6+1=7$, SYRIZA: $4+1=5$ ). This leaves $8-2=6$ residual seats to finalise the process. They are apportioned by greatest Quot. 2 remainders, first among the parties who so far did not receive any Phase-2 seats (EL, KINAL, KKE, XA), and then among the others (SYRIZA, ND). ${ }^{11}$

[^5]Table 3.9.2: Greece, from votes to seats.

| EP2019EL-2 | Votes | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Quot.-1 } \\ & \text { [HQ3] } \end{aligned}$ | Phase1 | UVP | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Quot.-2 } \\ & \text { [DQ5] } \end{aligned}$ | Phase2 | Seats (HQ3EL) | Political Group |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| ND | 1873137 | 6.96 | 6 | 257103 | 1.074 | 7+1 | 8 | EPP |
| SYRIZA | 1343595 | 4.99 | 4 | 266239 | 1.112 | 5+1 | 6 | GUE/NGL |
| KINAL | 436726 | 1.6 | 1 | 167387 | 0.699 | 1+1 | 2 | S\&D |
| KKE | 302603 | 1.1 | 1 | 33264 | 0.139 | 1+1 | 2 | NI |
| XA | 275734 | 1.02 | 1 | 6395 | 0.027 | 1+1 | 2 | NI |
| EL | 236347 | 0.9 | 0 | 236347 | 0.987 | 0+1 | 1 | ECR |
| Ineffective votes | 1187977 | - | - | 1187977 | - | - | - |  |
| Sum | 5656119 | [269 339] | 13 | 2154712 | [239 412] | 15+6 | 21 |  |

Within a party, the seats are assigned to the candidates who performed best in terms of their preference vote tallies.

Table 3.9.3: Greece, from seats to MEPs.

| EP2019EL-3 | Votes | 4. Stelios Kouloglou | 198436 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | ---: |
| ND |  | 5. Alexis GEORGOULIS | 162974 |
| 1. Stelios KYMPOUROPOULOS | 577114 | 6.Petros KOKKALIS | 140404 |
| 2. Vangelis MEIMARAKIS | 496600 | KINAL |  |
| 3. Maria SPYRAKI | 319237 | 1. Nikos ANDROULAKIS | 180822 |
| 4. Elissavet VOZEMPERGK-VRIONIDI | 288427 | 2. Eva KAILI | 145650 |
| 5. Emmanouil KEFALOGIANNIS | 257819 | KKE | 55956 |
| 6. Anna-Michelle ASIMAKOPOULOU | 225211 | 1. Konstantinos PAPADAKIS | 54 |
| 7. Georgios KYRTSOS | 196929 | 2. ${ }^{\text {a }}$ Lefteris NIKOLAOU-ALAVANOS | 34457 |
| 8. Theodoros ZAGORAKIS | 195264 | XA | 130488 |
| SYRIZA |  | 1. Ioannis LAGOS | 50360 |
| 1. Dimitrios PAPADIMOULIS | 272835 | 2. Athanasios KONSTANTINOU |  |
| 2. Elena Kountoura | 236961 | EL | 27665 |
| 3. Konstantinos ARVANITIS | 220816 | 1. ${ }^{\text {b }}$ Emmanouil FRAGKOS |  |

${ }^{\text {a }}$ ) Lefteris NIKOLAOU-ALAVANOS incoming for Asimina DIGENI (36 170 candidate votes).
${ }^{\text {b }}$ ) Emmanouil FRAGKos incoming for Kyriakos Velopoulos (159 319 candidate votes).

### 3.10. ES - Kingdom of Spain

Spain has a contingent of fifty-four seats which, after the UK left the EU, was raised by five seats. Candidate lists had to be submitted to the electoral authority at the latest ten days after the Royal Decree announcing the European elections and were published in the Official Journal on 30 April 2019. Thirty-two parties and coalitions contested the election, with a total of 1917 candidates.Every party had its own ballot paper. Voters select the ballot sheet of the party of their choice, put it into an apposite envelope, and cast the envelope into the ballot box.

Table 3.10.1: Spain, base data.

| EP2019ES-1 | $54+5$ |
| :--- | :--- |
| Seat contingent | 37248888 |
| Electorate | 1 |
| Constituencies | LV0 |
| Vote pattern | none |
| Electoral threshold | 32 |
| Apportionment parties | 22209330 |
| Effective votes | DivDwn |
| Apportionment method | 901 female +1016 male = 1917 |
| Candidates admitted | 24 female +27 male $=51$ |
| MEPs gender |  |

The whole country is treated as a single constituency. There is no electoral threshold. The apportionment of seats among parties is carried out using the divisor method with downward rounding. Every 360000 votes justify roughly one seat. Eight parties and coalitions obtain parliamentary seats, twenty-four parties are left empty-handed. With five added seats, because of the UK withdrawal from the EU, the electoral key drops to 337000 votes. Of the additional seats, one each goes to PSOE, PP, Cs, Vox, and Junts.

Table 3.10.2: Spain, from votes to seats.

| EP2019ES-2 | Votes | Quotient <br> [Divisor] | Seats <br> (DivDwn) | Political <br> Group |
| :--- | ---: | :---: | :---: | :--- |
| PSOE | 7369789 | 20.5 | $20+1$ | S\&D |
| PP | 4519205 | 12.6 | $12+1$ | EPP |
| Cs | 2731825 | 7.6 | $7+1$ | Renew Europe |
| Podemos-IU | 2258857 | 6.3 | 6 | (see Table 3.10.3) |
| Vox | 1393684 | 3.9 | $3+1$ | ECR |
| Ahora Repúblicas | 1252139 | 3.5 | 3 | (see Table 3.10.3) |
| Junts | 1018435 | 2.8 | $2+1$ | (see Table 3.10.3) |
| CEUS | 633090 | 1.8 | 1 | Renew Europe |
| 24 Others | $\mathbf{1 0 3 2 3 0 6}$ | - | 0 |  |
| Sum | $\mathbf{2 2} \mathbf{2 0 9 3 3 0}$ | [360 000] | $\mathbf{5 4 + 5}$ |  |

Spain uses a closed list system. Seats are assigned to candidates in the sequence of the printed partylists.

Table 3.10.3: Spain, from seats to MEPs.

| EP2019ES-3 | PP | Podemos-IU |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| PSOE | 1. Dolors Montserrat | 1. Eugenia Rodríguez Palop GUE/NGL |
| 21. ${ }^{\text {a }}$ Estrella DURÁ FERRANDIS | 2. Esteban GonZÁLEZ PONS | 2. Sira REGO GUE/NGL |
| 2. Iratxe GARCÍA PÉREZ | 3. Antonio LÓPEZ-Istúriz White | 3. Ernest URTASUN Greens/EFA |
| 3. Lina GÁlvez Muñoz | 4. Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez | 4. Idoia Villanueva Ruiz GUE/NGL |
| 4. Javi LÓPEZ | 5. Pilardel Castillo Vera | 5. Miguel Urbán Crespo GUE/NGL |
| 5. Inma Rodríguez-Piñero | 6. Javier ZARZALEJOS | 6. Manu PIneda GUE/NGL |
| 6. Ibán García del Blanco | 7. José Manuel García-Margallo | Vox |
| 7. Eider Gardiazabal RubiAL | 8. Francisco José Millán Mon | 1. Jorge BuXADÉ VILLALBA |
| 8. Nicolás GonzÁlez Casares | 9. Rosa EstarÀs Ferragut | 2. Mazaly AGUILAR |
| 9. Cristina Maestre Martín de Almagro | 10. Isabel Benjumea Benjumea | 3. Hermann TerTSCH |
| 10. César LUENA | 11. Pablo Arias Echeverría | +4. Margarita DE LA PISA CARRIÓN |
| 11. Clara AgUilera | 12. Leopoldo LÓPEZ GIL | Ahora Repúblicas |
| 12. Nacho SÁNCHEZ AmOR | +13. Gabriel Mato Adrover | 1. ${ }^{\text {b }}$ Oriol JUNQUERASIVIES |
| 13. Mónica Silvana GonZÁLEZ | Cs | 2. Pernando Barrena Arza GUE/NGL |
| 14. Juan Fernando LÓPEZ AGUILAR | 1. Luis GARICANO | 3. Diana Riba IGINER Greens/EFA |
| 15. Adriana MALDONADO LÓPEZ | 2. Maite PAGAZAURTUNDÚA | Junts |
| 16. Jonás FERNÁNDEZ | 3. María Soraya Rodríguez Ramos | 1. ${ }^{\text {b }}$ Carles PUIGDEMONT CASAMAJ |
| 17. Alicia Homs Ginel | 4. Javier NART | 2. ${ }^{\text {b }}$ Antoni COMín Oliveres |
| 18. Javier Moreno SÁNCHEZ | 5. José Ramón Bauzá Díaz | +3. Clara Ponsatí I Obiols NI |
| 19. Isabel GARCÍA MUÑOZ | 6. Jordi CAÑAS | CEUS |
| 20. Domènec Ruiz Devesa | 7. Susana Solís Pérez | 1.Izaskun BILBAO BARANDICA |
| +22. Marcos Ros Sempere | +8. Adrián VÁzQUEZ LÁzARA |  |
| ${ }^{\text {a }}$ ) Estrella DurÁ FERRANDES incoming for Josep Borrell Fontelles (list place 1). <br> ${ }^{\text {b }}$ ) Oriol Junquerasi Vies, Carles Puigdemont Casamaj, Antoni Comín Oliveres barred from taking their seats due to pending litigation. |  |  |

### 3.11. FI - Republic of Finland

Finland has a contingent of thirteen seats which, after the UK left the EU, was raised by one seat. Candidate lists had to be submitted by Thursday 18 April 2019. There are 269 candidates, listed alphabetically within their parties and identified by a serial number. Voters cast a vote for the candidate of their choice by writing his or her serial number onto the ballot sheet. The ballot sheet is frugal, just offering a circle where to jot down the candidate's number.

Table 3.11.1: Finland, base data.

| EP2019FI-1 |  |
| :--- | :--- |
| Seat contingent | $13+1$ |
| Electorate | 4504480 |
| Constituencies | 1 |
| Vote pattern | 1 CV |
| Electoral threshold | none |
| Apportionment parties | 18 |
| Effective votes | 1830045 |
| Apportionment method | DivDwn |
| Candidates admitted | 106 female +163 male = 269 |
| MEPs gender | 7 female +6 male $=13$ |

Finland is a single constituency. The votes for the candidates who are affiliated with the same party are aggregated. There is no electoral threshold. The seat apportionment uses the divisor method with downward rounding (DivDwn). Every 100000 votes justify roughly one seat. After the UKleaves the EU, with fourteen seats, the electoral key drops to 96000 votes. The fourteenth seat was apportioned to VIHR. Of the eighteen participating parties, eleven finish with no seat.

Table 3.11.2: Finland, from votes to seats.

| EP2019FI-2 | Votes | Quotient <br> [Divisor] | Seats <br> (DivDwn) | Political <br> Group |
| :--- | ---: | :---: | :---: | :--- |
| KOK | 380460 | 3.8 | 3 | EPP |
| VIHR | 292892 | 2.9 | $2+1$ | Greens/EFA |
| SDP | 267603 | 2.7 | 2 | S\&D |
| PS | 253176 | 2.5 | 2 | ID |
| KESK | 247477 | 2.5 | 2 | Renew Europe |
| V | 126063 | 1.3 | 1 | GUE/NGL |
| SFP | 115962 | 1.2 | 1 | Renew Europe |
| 11 Others | 146412 | - | 0 |  |
| Sum | $\mathbf{1 8 3 0} \mathbf{0 4 5}$ | $[\mathbf{1 0 0} \mathbf{0 0 0 ]}$ | $\mathbf{1 3 + 1}$ |  |

The assignment of seats to candidates is solely based on their personal vote tallies.
Table 3.11.3: Finland, from seats to MEPs.

| EP2019FI-3 | Votes | 2. Miapetra Kumpula-Natri | 68542 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| KOK |  | PS |  |
| 1. Sirpa PietikÄlnen | 77588 | 1. Laura HuHtasamil | 92760 |
| 2. Henna Virkkunen | 70687 | 2. Teuvo HakKarainen | 29083 |
| 3. Petri Sarvamaa | 64560 | KESK |  |
| VIHR |  | 1. Mauri Pekkarinen | 68487 |
| 1. Ville Nilinistö | 111714 | 2. Elsi Katainen | 54627 |
| 2. Heidi Hautala | 89769 | V |  |
| +3. Alviina AlAmetSÄ | 13687 | 1. Silvia Modig | 51844 |
| SDP |  | SFP |  |
| 1. Eero HEINÄLUOMA | 128234 | 1. Nils TORVALDS | 46473 |

### 3.12. FR - French Republic

France has a contingent of seventy-four seats which, after the UK left the EU, was raised by five seats. Thirty-four parties contested the election, nominating a total of 2618 candidates. Candidacies had to be declared to the Electoral Bureau of the Ministry of the Interior between Monday 23 April, and Friday 3 May, during opening hours. By law every list must alternate between female and male candidates. This secures gender parity among elected MEPs since France uses fixed lists (vote pattern LVO). Indeed, of the seventy-four MEPs thirty-seven are female and thirty-seven are male.

Table 3.12.1: France, base data.

| EP2019FR-1 |  |
| :--- | :--- |
| Seat contingent | $74+5$ |
| Electorate | 47345328 |
| Constituencies | 1 |
| Vote pattern | LV0 |
| Valid votes | 22655174 |
| Parties admitted | 34 |
| Electoral threshold | 1132759 ( $=5 \%$ of valid votes $)$ |
| Apportionment parties | 6 |
| Effective votes | 18173102 |
| Apportionment method | DivDwn |
| Candidates admitted | 1297 female +1321 male $=2618$ |
| MEPs gender | 37 female +37 male $=74$ |

Previously France established eight constituencies for separate evaluation of the election results. At the 2019 election France is taken to be a single constituency. There is an electoral threshold of five per cent of valid votes. With 22655174 valid votes, the threshold amounts to 1132759 votes. Twenty-eight parties stay below the threshold. Their votes accumulate to a remarkable share of twenty per cent of the valid votes ( 4482072 / $22655174=19.8 \%$ ). That is, of five votes, just four become effective, and one is discarded as ineffective.

The divisor method with downward rounding determines the apportionment of seats among parties. Every 237000 votes justify roughly one seat. With seventy-nine seats after the UK leaves the EU, the divisor becomes 220 600. The five additional seats will be handed out to RN (1), LREM (2), Les Verts (1), and PS (1).

Table 3.12.2: France, from votes to seats.

| EP2019FR-2 | Votes | Quotient <br> [Divisor] | Seats <br> (DivDwn) | Political <br> Group |
| :--- | ---: | :---: | :---: | :--- |
| Rassemblement national | 5286939 | 22.3 | $22+1$ | ID |
| LREM, MoDem et al. | 5079015 | 21.4 | $21+2$ | Renew Europe |
| EE Les Vertset al. | 3055023 | 12.9 | $12+1$ | Greens/EFA |
| Les Républicains et al. | 1920407 | 8.1 | 8 | EPP |
| La France insoumise et al. | 1428548 | 6.03 | 6 | GUE/NGL |
| Parti socialiste et al. | 1403170 | 5.9 | $5+1$ | S\&D |
| Sum | $\mathbf{1 8 1 7 3 1 0 2}$ | $[\mathbf{2 3 7} \mathbf{0 0 0 ]}$ | $\mathbf{7 4 + 5}$ |  |

The assignment of seats to candidates strictly follows the sequencing how candidates are listed in the registered party-lists.

Table 3.12.3: France, from seats to MEPs.

| EP2019FR-3 | 4. Jérémy DECERLE | 9. François ALFONSI |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Rassemblement national | 5. Catherine Chabaud | 10. Salima Yenbou |
| 1.Jordan BARDELLA | 6. Stéphane SÉOURNÉ | 11. Benoît Biteau |
| 2. Hélène LAPORTE | 7. Fabienne Keller | 12. Gwendoline Delbos-Corfield |
| 3. Thierry Mariani | 8. Bernard Guetta | +13. Claude Gruffat |
| 4. Dominique BILDE | 9. Irène Tolleret | Les Républicains |
| 5. Hervé Juvin | 10. Stéphane Bıoux | 1.François-Xavier Bellami |
| 6. Joëlle Melin | 11. Sylvie Brunet | 2. Agnès Evren |
| 7. Nicolas BAY | 12. Gilles Boyer | 3. Arnaud Danjean |
| 8. Virginie Joron | 13. Stéphanie Yon-Courtin | 4. Nadine Morano |
| 9. Jean-Paul Garraud | 14. Pierre Karleskind | 5. Brice Hortefeux |
| 10. Catherine GRISET | 15.Laurence FARRENG | 6. Nathalie Colin-Oesterlé |
| 11. Gilles Lebreton | 16. Dominique RIQUET | 7. Geoffroy DIDIER |
| 12. Maxette PIRBAKAS-GRISONI | 17. Véronique TriLlet-LeNOIR | 8. Anne SANDER |
| 13. Jean-François JALKH | 18. Pascal Durand | La France insoumise |
| 14. Aurélia BeIGNEUX | 19. Valérie HAYER | 1.Manon Aubry |
| 15. Gilbert Collard | 20. Christophe Grudler | 2. Manuel Bompard |
| 16. Julie LECHANTEUX | 21. Chrysoula Zacharopoulou | 3. Leïla CHAIBI |
| 17. Philippe Olivier | +22. Sandro Gozl | 4. Younous Omarjee |
| 18. Annika BrUNA | +23. Ilana Cicurel | 5. Anne-Sophie Pelletier |
| 19. Jérôme Rivière | EE Les Verts | 6. Emmanuel Maurel |
| 20. France JAMET | 1. Yannick Jadot | Parti socialist |
| 21. André RougÉ | 2. Michèle RIVASI | 1. Raphaël Glucksmann |
| 22. Mathilde ANDROUËT | 3. Damien Carême | 2. Sylvie GUILLAUME |
| +23. Jean-Lin LACAPELLE | 4. Marie Toussaint | 3.Éric ANDRIEU |
| LREM, MoDem | 5. David Cormand | 4. Aurore LALUCQ |
| 1. Nathalie LOISEAU | 6. Karima Delli | 5. Pierre LARROUTUROU |
| 2. Pascal CANFIN | 7. Mounir Satouri | +6. Nora Mebarek |
| 3. Marie-Pierre Vedrenne | 8. Caroline ROOSE |  |

### 3.13. HR - Republic of Croatia

Croatia has a contingent of eleven seats which, after the UK leaves the EU, will be raised by one seat. List proposals must be received by the State Electoral Commission at the latest within fourteen days of the day of calling the election. Domestic law requires the lists to contain at least forty per cent female candidates. Thirty-three parties contested the election, with a total of 404 candidates. On the ballot sheets voters mark a party (a list vote) and, optionally, a candidate (a preference vote). A pure preference vote is attributed to the candidate's party.

Table 3.13.1: Croatia, base data.

| EP2019HR-1 | $11+1$ |
| :--- | :--- |
| Seat contingent | 3696907 |
| Electorate | 1 |
| Constituencies | LV1 |
| Vote pattern | 1073954 |
| Valid votes | 33 |
| Parties admitted | 53698 ( $=5 \%$ of valid votes) |
| Electoral threshold | 6 |
| Apportionment parties | 738039 |
| Effective votes | DivDwn |
| Apportionment method | $10 \%$ bypass rule |
| Preference vote hurdle | 102 female +242 male $=404$ |
| Candidates admitted | 162 emale |
| MEPs gender | 4 female 7 male $=11$ |

There is an electoral threshold of five per cent of the valid votes total, 53698 . Twenty-seven parties miss the threshold, turning their aggregate 335915 votes ineffective (which is almost a third of all valid votes). The divisor method with downward rounding is used.Every 53000 votes justify roughly one seat. After the UK leaves the EU the key will be 50000 votes, the twelfth seat being apportioned to SDP.

Table 3.13.2: Croatia, from votes to seats.

| EP2019HR-2 | Votes | Quotient <br> [Divisor] | Seats <br> (DivDwn) | Political <br> Group |
| :--- | ---: | :---: | :---: | :--- |
| HDZ | 244076 | 4.6 | 4 | EPP |
| SDP | 200976 | 3.8 | $3+1$ | S\&D |
| HKS | 91546 | 1.7 | 1 | ECR |
| MK | 84765 | 1.6 | 1 | NI |
| ŽZ | 60847 | 1.1 | 1 | NI |
| A | 55829 | 1.1 | 1 | Renew Europe |
| Sum | $\mathbf{7 3 8} \mathbf{0 3 9}$ | $\mathbf{[ 5 3 0 0 0 ]}$ | $\mathbf{1 1 + 1}$ |  |

The seat assignment to candidates takes account of the preference votes by means of a ten per cent bypass rule. That is candidates whose preference votes meet or exceed ten per cent of their party's vote total jump to the top of the party-list, in decreasing order of their preference vote tallies.

Table 3.13.3: Croatia, from seats to MEPs.

| EP2019HR-3 | List | Preference |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Place | Votes |
| HDZ (Bypass hurdle: 10\% of $244076=$ |  |  |
| 24 408) |  |  |
| 1. Karlo ReSSLeR | 7 | 52859 |
| 2. Dubravka ŠuICA | $z$ | 31791 |
| 3. Tomislav Sokol | 3 | 4573 |
| 4.Željana Zovko | 4 | 9867 |
| SDP (Bypass hurdle: 10\% of $200976=$ |  |  |
|  |  |  |
| 1. Biljana Borzan | $z$ | 64736 |
| 2. Tonino PICULA | 7 | 50921 |
| 3. Predrag Fred Matić | 3 | 13.371 |
| +4. Romana Jerković | 4 | 1368 |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { HKS (Bypass hurdle: } 10 \% \text { of } 91546= \\ & 9 \text { 155) } \quad \end{aligned}$ |  |  |
| 1. Ruža TOMAŠıĆ | 7 | 69989 |
| MK  <br> $8477)$ (Bypass hurdle: $10 \%$ of $84765=$ |  |  |
| 1. Mislav Kolakušić | 7 | 68883 |
| ŽZ <br> $6085) \quad$ (Bypass hurdle: $10 \%$ of $60847=$ |  |  |
| 1.Ivan Vilibor SINČIĆ | 12 | 18314 |
| A  <br> 5583 ) (Bypass hurdle: $10 \%$ of $55829=$ |  |  |
| 1. Valter FLEGO | 4 | 21228 |

### 3.14. HU - Hungary

Hungary is allocated a contingent of twenty-one seats. Party list nomination lasted from 19 April 2019 to 23 A pril 2019.20000 valid voter recommendations were needed for putting forward a party list. Nine parties and coalitions contested the election, with a total of 292 candidates. On the ballot sheets voters mark a party-listshowing the firstfive nominees.

Table 3.14.1: Hungary, base data.

| EP2019HU-1 |  |
| :--- | :--- |
| Seat contingent | 21 |
| Electorate | 38008353 |
| Constituencies | 1 |
| Vote pattern | LV0 |
| Valid votes | 3470566 |
| Parties admitted | 9 |
| Electoral threshold | 173528 (= 5\% of valid votes) |
| Apportionment parties | 5 |
| Effective votes | 3175548 |
| Apportionment method | DivDwn |
| Candidates admitted | 61 female +231 male $=292$ |
| MEPs gender | 8 female +13 male $=21$ |

There is an electoral threshold of five per cent of valid votes which, quite unusually, is rounded downwards ( 173528 ). Four parties miss the threshold, leaving five apportionment parties. The seat apportionment uses the divisor method with downward rounding (DivDwn). Every 135000 votes justify roughly one seat.

Table 3.14.2: Hungary, from votes to seats.

| EP2019HU-2 | Votes | Quotient <br> [Divisor] | Seats <br> (DivDwn) | Political <br> Group |
| :--- | ---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Fidesz-KDNP | 1824220 | 13.5 | 13 | EPP |
| DK | 557081 | 4.1 | 4 | S\&D |
| Momentum | 344512 | 2.6 | 2 | Renew Europe |
| MSZP-P | 229551 | 1.7 | 1 | S\&D |
| JobbikK | 220184 | 1.6 | 1 | NI |
| Sum | $\mathbf{3 1 7 5 5 4 8}$ | $[\mathbf{1 3 5} \mathbf{0 0 0 ]}$ | $\mathbf{2 1}$ |  |

Hungary employs the fixed list system. Seats are assigned to candidates in the sequence presented on the party-list.

Table 3.14.3: Hungary, from seats to MEPs.

| EP2019HU-3 | 5. András GYÜRK | 11. Andor DeLI | 3. Sándor RónAI | MSZP-P |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Fidesz-KDNP | 6. Kinga GÁL | 12. Balázs HIDVÉGHI | 4. Attila ARA-KovÁcs | 2. ${ }^{\text {a }}$ István UJHELYI |
| 1. László TRÓCSÁNYı | 7. György Hölvényı | 13. Edina Tóth | Momentum | Jobbik |
| 2. József SzÁJeR | 8. Enikő GYŐRı | DK | 1. Katalin CSEH | 1. Márton GYÖNGYÖSI |
| 3. Lívia JÁrókA | 9. Ádám KósA | 1. Klára Dobrev | 2. Anna Júlia DoNÁTH |  |
| 4. Tamás DeUtsch | 10. Andrea Bocskor | 2. Csaba Molnár |  |  |

### 3.15. IE - Ireland

Ireland has a contingent of eleven seats which, after the UK left the EU, was raised by two seats. The period for the nomination of candidates is set at constituency level, starts about six weeks before polling day and lasts one or two weeks, depending on the nationality of the candidate. Fifty-nine candidates contested the election, of whom twenty-six figured as non-party candidates, i.e. they were not affiliated with one of the twelve contesting parties.

On the ballot sheet voters mark their preferences by writing 1 next to the candidate of their first choice, 2 next to the candidate of their second choice, and so on.

Table 3.15.1: Ireland, base data.

| EP2019lE-1 |  |
| :--- | :--- |
| Seat contingent | $11+2$ |
| Electorate | 3526023 |
| Constituencies | 3 |
| Vote pattern | STV |
| Valid votes | 1678003 |
| Parties admitted | $12+26$ independent candidates |
| Apportionment method | STVran |
| Candidates admitted | 24 female +35 male $=59$ |
| MEPs gender | 5 female +6 male $=11$ |

Domestic provisions establish threeconstituencies for separate evaluation:

1. Constituency of Dublin - 3 seats which, after the UK leaves the EU, will be raised to 4,
2. Constituency of Midlands-North-West - 4 seats,
3. Constituency of South -4 seats which, after the UK leaves the EU, will be raised to 5 .

Within each constituency ballots are evaluated using the single transferable vote scheme with random transfers (STVran). The applicable electoral key is the Droop-quota which, up to rounding, is the quotient of vote total and seat total plus one. However, in the constituencies of Dublin and South the seat totals differ for the periods before and after the UK leaves the EU, whence the induced Droop-quotas would differ too.

Unfortunately, STV schemes may fall victim to an awkward instance of opposing calculations, in that one or more of the MEPs elected under the supposition that a constituency commands three seats might fail to be among the MEPs elected under the supposition that the seat contingent is raised to four. In other words, the departure of the UK from the EU might entail the disruptive effect that an MEP from before would have to vacate his or her seat, for somebody else to take this seat afterwards. ${ }^{12}$ Therefore domestic provisions decreed the use of just a single calculation and to base this calculation on the seat contingents after the UK has left the EU. Furthermore it was provided that the last candidate elected in the Dublin constituency and the last candidate elected in the South constituency would takeup their seats only after the UK left the EU.

In the Dublin constituency the Droop-quota amounts to 363947 / (4+1) $=72790$. Hence every 72790 votes justify one seat. The count of first preferences reveals that no candidate reaches the quota. In a second count, the weakest candidate is eliminated andthe ballots on which he is marked

[^6]first preference are transferred to the candidates marked second preference. The elimination process continues until the thirteenth count by which time Ciarán CuFFe has accumulated 73028 votes of first and lower-order preferences and is assigned the first seat. In the fourteenth count Frances Fitzgerald passes the quota and is assigned the second seat. The sixteenth and last count finishes with four candidates, the previous two, Clare Daly with 87770 accumulated votes, and Barry AndREws ( 68952 votes). Hence Clare Daly is assigned the third seat, and Barry Andrews must wait to take the fourth seat until the UK leaves the EU.

In the Midlands-North-West constituency the Droop-quota equals 118986. That is, every 118986 votes justify one seat. Hence Mairead McGuInness, with 134630 first preference votes, is assigned the first seat. In the second count 15644 surplus votes of Mairead McGuinness are transferred by second preferences to the other candidates. Thereafter the system starts eliminating lower ranked candidates. Nobody reaches the quota until the thirteenth count, though, when the process finishes with the four MEPs shown in Table 3.15.2.

In the South constituency the Droop-quota requires 119855 votes. Hence every 119855 votes justify one seat. In the ninth and seventeenth counts the first and second seats are assigned, and in the twentieth and last count the remaining three, in the order as exhibited in Table 3.15.2.

Table 3.15.2: Ireland, from votes to MEPs.

| EP2019IE-2 | Party | 1st Preference Votes (STVran) | Political Group |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1. Constituency of Dublin |  |  |  |
| 1. Ciarán CuFFE | G.P. | 63849 | Greens/EFA |
| 2. Frances FITZGERALD | F.G. | 59067 | EPP |
| 3. Clare Daly | I.4.C. | 42305 | GUE/NGL |
| +4. Barry Andrews | F.F. | 51420 | Renew Europe |
| Lynn BoYLAN | S.F. | 39387 |  |
| Gary Gannon | S.D. | 20331 |  |
| Alex White | Lab. | 18293 |  |
| Mark Durkan | F.G. | 16473 |  |
| Gillian Brien | S.P.B.P. | 10864 |  |
| Rita Harrold | S.P.B.P. | 4967 |  |
| Éllis Ryan | W.P. | 3701 |  |
| 8 further candidates | Non-P. | 33290 |  |
| Sum |  | 363947 |  |
| 2. Constituency of Midlands-North-West |  |  |  |
| 1. Mairead McGuinness | F.G. | 134630 | EPP |
| 2. Luke Ming FLANAGHAN | Non-P. | 85034 | GUE/NGL |
| 3. Maria Walsh | F.G. | 64500 | EPP |
| 4. Matt Carthy | S.F. | 77619 | GUE/NGL |
| Peter CASEY | Non-P. | 56650 |  |
| Saoirse McHugh | G.P. | 51019 |  |
| Brendan MITH | F.F. | 42814 |  |
| Anne Rabbitte | F.F. | 30220 |  |
| Dominic Hannigan | Lab. | 12378 |  |
| Cyril Brennan | S.P.B.P | 8130 |  |
| Michael O'Dowd | R.I. | 6897 |  |
| Patrick Greene | D.D.I. | 1352 |  |
| 5 further candidates | Non-P. | 23684 |  |
| Sum |  | 594927 |  |


| 3. Constituency of South |  |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | ---: | :--- |
| 1. Seán KeLLY | F.G. | 118446 | EPP |
| 2. Billy KeLLEHER | F.F. | 84084 | Renew Europe |
| 3. Mick WALLACE | I.4.C. | 81780 | GUE/NGL |
| 4. Grace O'SULLIVAN | G.P. | 75887 | Greens/EFA |
| +5. Deirdre CLuNE | F.G. | 64605 | EPP |
| Liadh Ní RIADA | S.F. | 78995 |  |
| Malcolm BYRNE | F.F. | 69167 |  |
| Andrew DOYLE | F.G. | 38738 |  |
| Sheila NUNAN | Lab. | 22082 |  |
| Adrienne WALLACE | S.P.B.P. | 14810 |  |
| Peter O'LOUGHLIN | I.I. | 3685 |  |
| Jan VAN DE VEN | D.D.I. | 1421 |  |
| 11 further candidates | Non-P. | 65429 |  |
| Sum |  | $\mathbf{7 1 9 1 2 9}$ |  |

STV schemes generally qualify as proportional representation systems. The argument relies on the hypothetical assumption that we would be allowed to reinterpret first preference votes in terms of a 1 CV vote pattern, i.e. a voter casts one vote (namely the first preference vote) forthe candidate of her or his choice, and then all candidate votes are aggregated by party. The apportionment of thirteen seats among parties, using the divisor method with standard rounding (divisor 120000), would result in four seats (now five) for Fine Gael (F.G.), two seats (as is) for Fianna Fáil (F.F.), two seats (now one) for non-party candidates, two seats (now one) for Sinn Féin (S.F.), two seats (as is) for Green Party/Comhaontas Glas (G.P.), and one seat (nowtwo) for Independents 4 Change (I.4.C.). The agreement of results is persuasive, even though the argument needs to be viewed with care. For example, pooling all non-party candidates into a fictitious Non-P.-party is unlikely to be a reliable predictor of how voters really behave if the vote pattern were 1CV.

### 3.16. IT - Italian Republic

Italy has a seat contingent of seventy-three seats which, after the UK left the EU, was raised by three seats. Parties and candidates must register by the thirty-ninth day prior to election day. Lists of nominees have to be balanced by gender, also the first two candidates must be of different gender. ${ }^{13}$

Domestic provisions subdivide Italy into five districts and allocate the seventy-six seats after the UK leaves the EU between the districts by population figure:

1. Italia nord-occidentale -20 seats,
2. Italia nord-orientale -15 seats,
3. Italia centrale -15 seats,
4. Italia meridionale -18 seats,
5. Italia insulare -8 seats.

Parties of linguistic minorities may establish an alliance with a party campaigning in all five districts. In Italia nord-occidentale, the Autonomie per l'Europa party (ApE) of the French speaking minority in the Aosta Valley is allied with the Partito Democratico (PD). In Italia nord-orientale, the Südtiroler Volkspartei (SVP) of the German-speaking minority in South Tyrol is allied with Forza Italia (FD).

Parties present lists of candidates separately by district. A candidate may be nominated on several lists. Ballot papers in different districts have different colours (grey, brown, red, orange, pink). Voters stamp a mark next to the symbol of the party of their choice. They may add up to three preference votes by writing the candidates' names next to the party symbol. In case of three preferences at least one has to be male and one female, in the absence of gender diversity the second and third preferences are deemed null and void.

Table 3.16.1: Italy, base data.

| EP2019IT-1 |  |
| :--- | :--- |
| Seat contingent | $73+3$ |
| Electorate | 50952719 |
| Electoral districts | 5 |
| Vote pattern | 3 CV |
| Valid votes | 26783732 |
| Lists admitted | per district: 16, 17, 15, 15, 15 |
| Electoral threshold | $1071350(=4 \%$ of valid votes $)$ |
| Apportionment parties | 5 |
| Effective votes | 24071889 |
| Apportionment method | HQ1grR, HQ1 grR |
| Preference vote hurdle | none |
| Candidates admitted | 468 female +497 male $=965$ |
| MEPs gender | 30 female +43 male $=73$ |

There is an electoral threshold of four per cent of the valid votes (1 071350 votes). The threshold eliminates eleven parties. The seat apportionment calculations use the Hare-quota variant-1 method with fit by greatest remainders (HQ1grR). Variant-1 of the Hare-quota is the integer part of the ratio of effective votes to available seats. For the state-wide super-apportionment the quota

[^7]amounts to 316735 . That is, every 316735 votes justify roughly one seat. For the sub-apportionments in the five districts the electoral key is, respectively, $353461,345575,330054,276045$, and 237424 votes.

The super-apportionment produces state-wide seat numbers for the parties. Domestic provisions decree that these state-wide results take precedence. This enforcement of the state-wide view distinguishes electoral systems with a subdivision into several districts ( $\mathrm{DE}, \mathrm{IT}, \mathrm{PL}$ ) from systems that establish several constituencies ( $B E, I E, U K$ ).

Generally, since candidates are nominated at the district level, the law provides for a break-down of state-wide party seats to districts. The break-down is in two steps. The first step apportions, separately within every district, the preordained district seats among parties. This step is selfsufficient; it entirely disregards the available super-apportionment. The second step aggregates,for every party, the district results of the first step and only then checks fordiscrepancies with the superapportionment. If a discrepancy is encountered, the party's district results are adjusted until the discrepancy vanishes, in order to achieve conformity with the super-apportionment.

Specifically, Lega, Salvini Premier and PD+ApE finish with district results that are in agreement with the super-apportionment, no further action is needed. In contrast, Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S) is apportioned two seats too much. The party has four quotients whose remainders are rounded upwards (. $47, .73, .67, .81$ in districts $1,2,3,4$ ). In order to adjust M5S to its state-wide due the two smallest of these four remainders are rounded downwards (.47, . 67 in districts 1,3 ). This adjustment reduces the party's seat number in Italia nord-occidentale from three to two, and also in Italia centrale. To restore the balance in these districts, the seat numbers of $\mathrm{FI}+\mathrm{SVP}$ and Fratelli d'Italia, whose discrepancies oppose the discrepancy of M5S, are increased appropriately. The process has a somewhat makeshift character;it works out fine with the 2019 data.

Table 3.16.2: Italy, from votes to seats.

| EP2019IT-2 | Votes |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :--- |
| Super-apportionment |  |  |  |  |  |
| Quotient |  |  |  |  |  |
| [Split] |  |  |  |  |  | \(\left.\begin{array}{c}Seats <br>


(HQ1grR)\end{array}\right)\)| Political |
| :---: |
| Group |$|$


| Party | Votes | Quotient [Split] | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Seats } \\ & \text { (HQ1grR } \\ & \text { ) } \end{aligned}$ | Party | Votes | Quotient [Split] | Seats (HQ1grR) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1. Italia nord-occidentale |  |  |  | 2. Italia nord-orientale |  |  |  |
| Lega | 3193908 | 9.04 | 9 | Lega | 2381555 | 6.89 | 7 |
| PD+ApE | 1866777 | 5.28 | 5 | PD | 1388378 | 4.02 | 4 |
| M5S | 873749 | 2.47 | $3-1=2$ | M5S | 599106 | 1.73 | 2 |
| FI | 691037 | 1.96 | 2 | FI+SVP | 481201 | 1.39 | 1 |
| Fdl | 443763 | 1.26 | $1+1=2$ | Fdl | 333390 | 0.96 | 1 |
| Sum | $\begin{array}{r} 706923 \\ 4 \end{array}$ | [.4] | 20 | Sum | 5183630 | [.5] | 15 |
| 3. Italia centrale |  |  |  | 4. Italia meridionale |  |  |  |
| Lega | 1848005 | 5.60 | 6 | Lega | 1291546 | 4.68 | 5 |
| PD | 1488260 | 4.51 | 4 | PD | 984619 | 3.57 | 4 |
| M5S | 882802 | 2.67 | $3-1=2$ | M5S | 1603392 | 5.81 | 6 |
| FI | 345788 | 1.05 | $1+1=2$ | FI | 674489 | 2.44 | 2 |
| Fdl | 385962 | 1.17 | 1 | Fdl | 414767 | 1.50 | 1 |
| Sum | $\begin{array}{r} 495081 \\ 7 \end{array}$ | [.55] | 15 | Sum | 4968813 | [.53] | 18 |
| 5. Italia insulare |  |  |  | Aggregation | Super-app. | Addition | Discrepanc y |
| Lega | 460194 | 1.94 | 2 | Lega | 29 | 29 | 0 |
| PD | 379511 | 1.60 | 2 | PD+ApE | 19 | 19 | 0 |
| M5S | 610040 | 2.57 | 2 | M5S | 14 | 16 | -2 |
| FI | 301343 | 1.27 | 1 | $\mathrm{FI}+\mathrm{SVP}$ | 8 | 7 | +1 |
| Fdl | 148307 | 0.63 | 1 | Fdl | 6 | 5 | +1 |
| Sum | $\begin{array}{r} 189939 \\ 5 \end{array}$ | [.58] | 8 | Sum | 76 | 76 | $\pm 2$ |

The assignment of seats to candidates is based on the personal votes for the candidates. A candidate who is elected in several districts may choose where to accept the mandate.

Table 3.16.3: Italy, from seats to MEPs.


The three candidates who assumed office after the UK left the EU are Vincenzo Sofo (Italia meridionale, Lega), Salvatore DEMEO (Italia centrale, Forza Italia) and Sergio Antonio BERLATO (Italia orientale, Fratelli d'Italia).

### 3.17. LT - Republic of Lithuania

Lithuania is allocated a contingent of eleven seats. The Central Electoral Commission accepts application documents 85 days before elections. Registration ends 65 days prior to the elections. Sixteen parties and coalitions and 302 candidates contested the election. The ballot sheet shows the names of all parties and of all candidates. Voters mark a party and may add up to five candidate votes by writing the serial numbers of their preferred candidates into designated boxes.

There is an electoral threshold of five per cent of votes cast. With a total of 1332020 ballots, the threshold requires 66601 votes. Seven parties pass the threshold and their 954709 votes become effective. If fewer than sixty per cent of votes cast (799212) had become effective, the threshold would have had to be lowered. This is not the case, whence the five per cent threshold persists.

Table 3.17.1: Lithuania, base data.

| EP2019LT-1 |  |
| :--- | :--- |
| Seat contingent | 11 |
| Electorate | 2490542 |
| Constituencies | 1 |
| Vote pattern | 5 CV |
| Votes cast | 1332020 |
| Parties admitted | 16 |
| Electoral threshold | 66601 ( $=5 \%$ of votes cast $)$ |
| Apportionment parties | 7 |
| Effective votes | 954709 |
| Apportionment method | HQ2grR |
| Candidates admitted | 101 female +201 male $=302$ |
| MEPs gender | 3 female +8 male $=11$ |

The apportionment of seats among parties uses the Hare-quota variant-2 method with fit by greatest remainders (HQ2grR). To obtain variant-2 of the Hare-quota, the ratio of effective votes to seats is rounded upwards to yield 86792 . That is, every 86792 votes justify roughly one seat.

Table 3.17.2: Lithuania, from votes to seats.

| EP2019LT-2 | Votes | Quotient <br> [Split] | Seats <br> (HQ2grR) | Political <br> Group |
| :--- | ---: | :---: | :---: | :--- |
| TS-LKD | 248736 | 2.9 | 3 | EPP |
| LSDP | 200105 | 2.3 | 2 | S\&D |
| LVŽS | 158190 | 1.8 | 2 | Greens/EFA |
| DP | 113243 | 1.3 | 1 | Renew Europe |
| LRLS | 83083 | 1.0 | 1 | Renew Europe |
| VKM-AMT | 82005 | 0.9 | 1 | EPP |
| KKŠS | 69347 | 0.8 | 1 | ECR |
| Sum | $\mathbf{9 5 4 7 0 9}$ | $[.5]$ | $\mathbf{1 1}$ |  |

The assignment of seats to candidates is based solely on the candidates' preference votes.
Table 3.17.3: Lithuania, from seats to MEPs.

| EP2019LT-3 | Votes | 2. Juozas OlEKAS | 62418 | LRLS |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| TS-LKD |  | LVŽS |  | 1. Petras AuŠTREVIČIUS | 46815 |
| 1. Andrius Kubilius | 112375 | 1. Bronis Ropé | 56649 | VKM-AMT |  |
| 2. Liudas MAŽYLIS | 111100 | 2. ${ }^{\text {a }}$ Stasys JAKELIŨNAS | 30760 | 1. Aušra Maldeikienė | 47714 |
| 3. Rasa JuknevičIENĖ | 100994 | DP |  | KKŠS |  |
| LSDP |  | 1. Viktor USPASKICH | 37676 | 1.Valdemar TOMAŠEVSKI | 29142 |
| 1. Vilija Blinkevičıūtė | 104501 |  |  |  |  |

### 3.18. LU - Grand Duchy of Luxembourg

Luxembourg is allocated a contingent of six seats. Candidate lists are definitively adopted 72 days before election day. Every party nominates a list of six candidates. Voters have up to six votes which they may allocate to candidates of different lists (panachage), with at mosttwo votes per candidate (cumulation). Alternatively a voter may marka party; then the mark is expanded into six votes, one for each of the party's six candidates. The number of valid votes is 1256624 , originating from a total of 218177 valid ballots. Thus a ballot features $1256624 / 218177=5.8$ votes on average.

Table 3.18.1: Luxembourg, base data.

| EP2019LU-1 |  |
| :--- | :--- |
| Seat contingent | 6 |
| Electorate | 285435 |
| Constituencies | 1 |
| Vote pattern | 6 CV |
| Electoral threshold | none |
| Apportionment parties | 10 |
| Effective votes | 1256624 |
| Apportionment method | DivDwn |
| Candidates admitted | 30 female +36 male $=66$ |
| MEPs gender | 3 female +3 male = 6 |

The apportionment of seats among the ten parties is proportional to the sum of the votes for the parties' candidates. There is no electoral threshold. The divisor method with downward rounding (DivDwn) is applied. Every 130000 votes justify roughly one seat.

Table 3.18.2: Luxembourg, from votes to seats.

| EP2019LU-2 | Votes | Quotient <br> [Divisor] | Seats <br> (DivDwn) | Political <br> Group |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :--- |
| DP | 269259 | 2.1 | 2 | Renew Europe |
| CSV | 265105 | 2.04 | 2 | EPP |
| Déi gréng | 237615 | 1.8 | 1 | Greens/EFA |
| LSAP | 153396 | 1.2 | 1 | S\&D |
| 6 Others | 331349 | - | 0 |  |
| Sum | 1256624 | $[130000]$ | 6 |  |

The assignment of the seats of a party to its candidates follows the ranking by the candidates' vote tallies.

Table 3.18.3: Luxembourg, from seats to MEPs.

| EP2019LU-3 | Votes |
| :--- | :--- |
| DP |  |
| 1. Charles GoERENS | 97548 |
| 2. Monica SEMEDO | 50954 |
| CSV |  |
| 1. Christophe HANSEN | 62732 |
| 2. Isabel WISELER-LIMA | 49582 |
| Déi gréng |  |
| 1. Tilly MeTZ | 55465 |
| LSAP |  |
| 1. Nicolas SCHMIT | 39152 |

### 3.19. LV - Republic of Latvia

Latvia is allocated a contingent of eight seats. The last day for the submission of lists of candidates is the sixty-fifth day before election day. The election was contested by 255 candidates from sixteen parties. Every party or coalition has its own ballot paper. Voters cast one party vote. For every candidate of the party of their choice, voters may express a preference (a 'plus') if they wish to endorse the candidate, or a non-preference (a 'crossing-out') if they object to the candidate. Altogether voters dealt out 7736112 pluses and crossings-out.

Table 3.19.1: Latvia, base data.

| EP2019LV-1 |  |
| :--- | :--- |
| Seat contingent | 8 |
| Electorate | 1414712 |
| Constituencies | 1 |
| Vote pattern | mCV |
| Votes cast | 473260 |
| Parties admitted | 16 |
| Electoral threshold | 23663 ( $=5 \%$ of votes cast $)$ |
| Apportionment parties | 6 |
| Effective votes | 397949 |
| Apportionment method | DivStd |
| Candidates admitted | 74 female +181 male $=255$ |
| MEPs gender | 4 female +4 male $=8$ |

There is a five per cent threshold relative to votes cast, 22663 , which is passed by six parties. The seat apportionment among the six parties is carried out using the divisor method with standard rounding (DivStd). Every 51000 votes justify roughly oneseat.

Table 3.19.2: Latvia, from votes to seats.

| EP2019LV-2 | Votes | Quotient <br> [Divisor] | Seats <br> (DivStd) | Political <br> Group |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :--- |
| New Unity | 124193 | 2.4 | 2 | EPP |
| Harmony | 82604 | 1.6 | 2 | S\&D |
| National Alliance | 77591 | 1.52 | 2 | ECR |
| Development+For! | 58763 | 1.2 | 1 | Renew Europe |
| Latvian Russion Union | 29546 | 0.6 | 1 | Greens/EFA |
| Union of Greens and Farmers | 25252 | 0.495 | 0 |  |
| Sum | $\mathbf{3 9 7} 949$ | $[\mathbf{5 1 0 0 0 ]}$ | $\mathbf{8}$ |  |

The assignment of seats within a party follows the candidates' ranking that is induced by their vote balances. The vote balance of a candidate is the number of votes of the candidate's party plus the number of the candidate's pluses minus the number of the candidate's crossings-out.

Table 3.19.3: Latvia, from seats to MEPs.

| EP2019LV-3 | Vote Balance | National Alliance |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| New Unity |  | 1. Roberts Zīle | 130604 |
| 1. ${ }^{\text {a }}$ Inese Vaidere | 33817 | 2. Dace MelbĀRDE | 85364 |
| 2. Sandra Kalniete | 177538 | Development+For! |  |
| Harmony |  | 1. Ivars IJABS | 90716 |
| 1. Nils UŠAKOVS | 149931 | Latvian Russion Union |  |
| 2. Andris Ameriks | 98022 | 1.Tatjana ŽDANOKA | 46905 |
| ) Inese Vaidere incom | g for Valdis D | ROVSKIS (vote balan | 10582 |

### 3.20. MT - Republic of Malta

Malta is allocated a contingent of six seats. The nomination dates for the 2019 elections were 16, 17, 18, 20 and 22 April 2019. Of the forty-one candidates, thirty-six were affiliated with the eight contesting parties, and five stood as independent candidates.

Table 3.20.1: Malta, base data.

| EP2019MT-1 |  |
| :--- | :--- |
| Seat contingent | 6 |
| Electorate | 371643 |
| Constituencies | 1 |
| Vote pattern | STV |
| Valid votes | 260212 |
| Parties admitted | 8, plus 5 independent candidate |
| Apportionment method | STVran |
| Candidates admitted | 10 female +31 male $=41$ |
| MEPs gender | 3 female +3 male $=6$ |

On the ballot sheet voters mark their preferences by writing 1 next to the candidate of their first choice, 2 next to the candidate of their second choice, and so on. The ballots are evaluated using the single transferable vote scheme with random transfers (STVran). The electoral key is given by the Droop-quota which, up to rounding, is the quotient of vote total and seat total plus one, 37174. That is, every 37174 votes justify one seat.

Two candidates win more first preferences than the quota demands, whence they are assigned the first two seats. Their surplus votes are transferred to the remaining field and then lower ranked candidates are eliminated, one by one. On counts 14 and 38 the next two candidates reach the quota and are declared elected, on count 39 the last two. Four MEPs belong to the Partit Laburista (PL), and the other two to Partit Nazzjonalista (PN).

Table 3.20.2: Malta, from votes to MEPs.

| EP2019MT-2 | Party | 1st Preference <br> Votes (STVran) | Political <br> Group |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 1. Miriam DALI | PL | 63438 | S\&D |
| 2. Roberta MEISOLA | PN | 38206 | EPP |
| 3.Alfred AANT | PL | 26592 | S\&D |
| 4.David CASA | PN | 20493 | EPP |
| 5. Alex AGIUS SALBA | PL | 18808 | S\&D |
| 6. Josiane CuTAAAR | PL | 15603 | S\&D |
| 35 further candidates |  | 77072 |  |
| Sum |  | $\mathbf{2 6 0 2 1 2}$ |  |

As in Section 3.15 proportionality may be appraised by assuming that a first preference vote for a candidate can be taken to be a vote for the candidate's party. The first preferences for all candidates of PL sum to 141 267, the corresponding sum for PN is 98611 . The proportional share of six seats justifies four seats for PL and two seats for PN, just as is. If seats had been assigned to candidates according to the rank-order that results from their first preference tallies, the same six candidates would have been elected.

### 3.21. NL - Kingdom of the Netherlands

The Netherlands have twenty-six seats which, after the UK left the EU, was raised by three seats. Nominations of candidates must be filed by the forty-third day before polling day. Sixteen parties contested the election, with a total of 316 candidates. The ballot sheet shows all parties with all of their candidates. Every voter marks one candidate of the party of his or her choice. Other than in 2009 and 2014, the 2019 election did not feature any list alliances.

Table 3.21.1: Netherlands, base data.

| EP2019NL-1 | $26+3$ |
| :--- | :--- |
| Seat contingent | 13164688 |
| Electorate | 1 |
| Constituencies | LV1 |
| Vote pattern | 5497813 |
| Valid votes | 16 |
| Parties admitted | $(=5 \%$ of votes cast $)$ |
| Electoral threshold | 9 |
| Apportionment parties | 4923208 |
| Effective votes | DivDwn |
| Apportionment method | Quorum bypass rule |
| Preference vote hurdle | Qura female +194 male $=316$ |
| Candidates admitted | 122 female 13 male $=26$ |
| MEPs gender | 13 female 13 |

An electoral threshold is looming in the depth of the provisions. For a party to be awarded at least one seat, its vote count must exceed a number which the provisions refer to as the electoral divisor. The electoral divisor is the quotient of valid votes and seats: $5497813 / 26=211455$. Relative to the 5519776 votes cast the threshold amounts to $211455 / 5519776=3.8$ per cent and stays below the five per cent ceiling. Nine parties pass the threshold and enter the apportionment stage, as far as the 26 seats are concerned before the UK leaves the EU. The divisor method with downward rounding is used (DivDwn). Every 164000 votes justify roughly one seat.

Table 3.21.2: Netherlands, from votes to seats.

| EP2019NL-2 | Votes | Quotient <br> [Divisor] | Seats <br> (DivDwn) | Political <br> Group |
| :--- | ---: | :---: | :---: | :--- |
| P.v.d.A. | 1045274 | 6.4 | 6 | S\&D |
| VVD | 805100 | 4.9 | $4+1$ | Renew Europe |
| CDA | 669555 | 4.1 | 4 | EPP |
| Forum voor Democratie | 602507 | 3.7 | $3+1$ | ECR |
| GroenLinks | 599283 | 3.7 | 3 | Greens/EFA |
| D66 | 389692 | 2.4 | 2 | Renew Europe |
| ChristenUnie - SGP | 375660 | 2.3 | 2 | (see Table 3.21.3) |
| Partij voor de Dieren | 220938 | 1.3 | 1 | GUE/NGL |
| 50Plus | 215199 | 1.3 | 1 | EPP |
| PVV | 194178 | - | $0+1$ |  |
| Sum | $\mathbf{4 9 2 3} \mathbf{2 0 8}$ | $\mathbf{[ 1 6 4} \mathbf{0 0 0 ]}$ | $\mathbf{2 6 + 3}$ |  |

With 29 seats after the UK left the EU, the threshold drops to 5497813 / $29=189580$. A tenth party would be admitted into the seat apportionment calculations (PVV). Every 150000 votes would justify roughly one seat. The three added seats benefit PVV, VVD, and FvD.

However, the official Proces-verbaal of final results was restricted to the apportionment of the 26 seats while the UK was a member of the EU. If the apportionment of the 29 seats after resignation of the UK were limited to the initial nine parties, the PVV seat would be allotted to GroenLinks.

The assignment of seats to candidates makes use of a quorum bypass rule. A candidate whose preference votes tally meets or exceeds one tenth of the electoral divisor is exempt from the preordained rank-order on the submitted list and moves to the top. Hence all candidates are subject to the uniform bypass hurdle 21 146, no matter whether their party is stronger or weaker.

Table 3.21.3: Netherlands, from seats to MEPs.

| EP2019NL-3 | List | Candidate |
| :--- | :--- | ---: |

P.v.d.A. (Bypass hurdle:

21 146)

| 1. ${ }^{\text {a }}$ Lara WoLTERS | 7 | 4888 |
| :--- | :--- | ---: |
| 2. Agnes JONGERIUS | $z$ | 109987 |
| 3. Kati PIRI | 4 | 29475 |
| 4. Paul TANG | 3 | 8497 |
| 5. Vera TAX | 5 | 12760 |
| 6. Mohammed CHAHIM | 6 | 2825 |

VVD (Bypass hurdle:

| 21 146) |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 1. Malik AZMANI | + | 365155 |
| 2. Caroline NAGTEGAAL | 3 | 163279 |
| 3. Jan HuITEMA | $Z$ | 115738 |
| 4. Liesje SCHREINEMACHER | 5 | 37519 |
| +5. Bart GROOTHUIS | 4 | 21353 |


| CDA | (Bypass hurdle: |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | ---: | :---: |
| 21 146) |  |  |  |
| 1. Esther de LANGE | + | 402975 |  |
| 2. Annie SCHREIJER-PIERIK | 4 | 113914 |  |
| 3. Jeroen LENAERS | $Z$ | 50121 |  |
| 4. Tom BERENDSEN | $\mathbf{Z}$ | 28579 |  |


| 4. Tom BERENDSEN | 3 |
| :---: | :---: |
| Forum voor Democratie | (Bypass hurdle: |

21 146)

| 1. Derk Jan EPPINK | 4 | 339988 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2. ${ }^{\text {b }}$ Rob Rooken | 3 | 10143 |
| 3. Robert Roos | z | 41323 |
| +4. Dorien ROOKMAKER | 4 | 15-403 |
| 21 146) | (Bypass hurdle: |  |
| 1. Bas Eickhout | 4 | 263034 |
| 2. Tineke Strik | z | 149628 |
| 3. Kim van Sparrentak | 7 | 32505 |


| D66 | (Bypass hurdle: |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | ---: | :---: |
| 21 146) | Sophie in 't VeLD |  |  |
|  | + | 248383 |  |
| 2. Samira RAFAELA |  | 3 |  |

ChristenUnie-SGP (Bypass hurdle:

| 21 146) |  |  |  |
| ---: | :---: | :---: | ---: |
| 1. Peter van DALEN | EPP | + | 240459 |
| 2. Bert-Jan RUISSEN | ECR | z | 44416 |


| Partij voor de Dieren | (Bypass hurdle: |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1. Anja HAZEKAMP | 4 | 136224 |
| 50Plus |  | rdle: |
| 21 146) |  |  |
| 1. Antonius Manders | 4 | 127228 |
| Partij voor de Vrijheid (Bypass hurdle: |  |  |
| 21 146) |  |  |
| Geert Wilders | 10 | 8344 |

a) Lara WOLTERS incoming for Frans TIMMERMANNS (839 240 candidate votes)
${ }^{\text {b }}$ ) Rob ROOKEN incoming for Thierry BAUDET (164 711 candidate votes).

### 3.22. PL - Republic of Poland

Poland has a contingent of fifty-one seats which, after the UK left the EU, was raised by one seat. Candidate lists in a given region had to be submitted to the constituency electoral commission no later than 16 April 2019. Nine parties contested the election, with a total of 868 candidates. Thirtyfive per cent of the candidates of a party must be female. Every party has its own ballot paper exhibiting all nominees. The ballot papers are collated into a booklet, one within each of the thirteen electoral districts into which the country is subdivided. Voters have a single vote to mark a candidate of the party of their choice. The votes of a party are obtained byaggregating the votes for the party's candidates.

Table 3.22.1: Poland, base data.

| EP2019PL-1 |  |
| :--- | :--- |
| Seat contingent | $51+1$ |
| Electorate | 30118852 |
| Electoral districts | 13 |
| Vote pattern | 1 CV |
| Valid votes | 13647311 |
| Parties admitted | 9 |
| Electoral threshold | $682366(=5 \%$ of valid votes $)$ |
| Apportionment parties | 3 |
| Effective votes | 12269690 |
| Apportionment method | DivDwn, HaQgrR |
| Candidates admitted | 406 female +462 male $=868$ |
| MEPs gender | 18 female +33 male $=51$ |

There is an electoral threshold of five per cent of the valid votes ( 682366 ). It leaves but three lists. We refer to the state-wide apportionment of seats among parties as the super-apportionment. The super-apportionment uses the divisor method with downward rounding (DivDwn). Every 230000 votes justify roughly one seat. After the UK leaves the EU the key drops to 229000 votes, with the additional seat going to PiS.

Since parties nominate their candidates separately by district, the overall seats of a party must be sub-apportioned among the thirteen districts. This calls for three sub-apportionment calculations, one for each party. They are carried out using the Hare-quota method with fit by greatest remainders (HaQgrR). ${ }^{14}$

Repeated applications of the method may exhibit strange effects. When more seats become available, such as when the overall seats of PiS grow from 26 to 27 , possibly some seats are retracted. ${ }^{15}$ To avoid this problem the method is applied just once during the PiS subapportionment, to the 27 seats after the UK leaves the EU. Of these 27 MEPs the one with the fewest candidate votes had to wait for the UK to leave the EU before assuming office.

[^8]Table 3.22.2: Poland, from votes to seats.

| EP2019PL-2 | Votes | Quotient <br> [Divisor] | Seats <br> (DivDwn) | Political <br> Group |
| :--- | ---: | :---: | :---: | :--- |
| PiS | 6192780 | 26.9 | $26+1$ | ECR |
| Coal. KE | 5249935 | 22.8 | 22 | (see Table 3.22.3.) |
| Wiosna | 826975 | 3.6 | 3 | S\&D |
| Sum | $\mathbf{1 2 2 6 9} \mathbf{6 9 0}$ | $[\mathbf{2 3 0} \mathbf{0 0 0}]$ | $\mathbf{5 1 + 1}$ |  |


| District | Votes | Quotient [Split] | Seats (HaQgrR) | Votes | Quotient [Split] | Seats (HaQgrR) | Votes | Quotient [Split] | Seats (HaQgrR) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | PiS sub-apportionment |  |  | Coal. KE sub-apportionment |  |  | Wiosna sub-apportionment |  |  |
| 1. Gdańsk | 285740 | 1.25 | 1 | 419182 | 1.8 | 2 | 50862 | 0.2 | 0 |
| 2.Bydgoszcz | 260408 | 1.1 | 1 | 305362 | 1.3 | 1 | 39412 | 0.1 | 0 |
| 3. Olsztyn | 375001 | 1.6 | 2 | 293677 | 1.2 | 1 | 45424 | 0.2 | 0 |
| 4. Warszawa 1 | 447770 | 1.95 | 2 | 625719 | 2.6 | 3 | 142443 | 0.5 | 1 |
| 5. Warszawa 2 | 512158 | 2.2 | 2 | 227106 | 1.0 | 1 | 33302 | 0.1 | 0 |
| 6. Łódź | 426046 | 1.9 | 2 | 347620 | 1.46 | 1 | 50696 | 0.2 | 0 |
| 7. Poznań | 460432 | 2.007 | 2 | 518706 | 2.2 | 2 | 93504 | 0.34 | 1 |
| 8. Lublin | 436139 | 1.9 | 2 | 208392 | 0.9 | 1 | 22692 | 0.1 | 0 |
| 9. Rzeszów | 485779 | 2.1 | 2 | 160988 | 0.7 | 1 | 22881 | 0.1 | 0 |
| 10. Kraków | 980816 | 4.28 | 4 | 505400 | 2.1 | 2 | 78568 | 0.3 | 0 |
| 11. Katowice | 691641 | 3.02 | 3 | 643567 | 2.7 | 3 | 93120 | 0.34 | 1 |
| 12. Wrocław | 506921 | 2.2 | 2 | 574397 | 2.4 | 2 | 88515 | 0.32 | 0 |
| 13. Gorzów Wielkopolskim | 323929 | 1.4 | 2 | 419819 | 1.8 | 2 | 65556 | 0.2 | 0 |
| Sum | 6192780 | [.3] | 27 | 5249935 | [.5] | 22 | 826975 | [.33] | 3 |

Within a party and district, the assignment of seats follows the candidates' vote tallies.
Table 3.22.3: Poland, from seats to MEPs.

| EP2019PL-3 | Votes | 13.2. Elżbieta RaFALSKA |  | 70916 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| PiS |  | Coalition KE |  |  |
| 1.1. Anna FOTYGA | $\begin{array}{r} 16051 \\ 7 \end{array}$ | 1.1. Magdalena ADAMOWICZ EPP |  | 199591 |
| 2.1. Kosma ZŁOTOWSK | $\begin{array}{r} 10711 \\ 3 \end{array}$ | 1.2. Janusz LEWANDOWSKI | EPP | 120990 |
| 3.1. Karol KARSKI | $\begin{array}{r} 18405 \\ 4 \end{array}$ | 2.1. Radosław SIKORSKI | EPP | 129339 |
| 3.2. Krzysztof JURGIEL | $\begin{array}{r} 10459 \\ 2 \end{array}$ | 3.1. Tomasz Frankowski | EPP | 125845 |
| 4.1. Jacek SARYUSZ-WOLSKI | $\begin{array}{r} 18685 \\ 1 \end{array}$ | 4.1. Włodzimierz CIMOSZEWICZ | S\&D | 219677 |
| 4.2. Ryszard CzARNECKI | $\begin{array}{r} 13462 \\ 9 \end{array}$ | 4.2. Danuta Maria HÜBNER | EPP | 146746 |
| 5.1. Adam BieLAN | $\begin{array}{r} 20784 \\ 5 \end{array}$ | 4.3. Andrzej Halicki EPP |  | 87422 |
| 5.2. Zbigniew KuŹMIUK | $\begin{array}{r} 13440 \\ 5 \end{array}$ | 5.1. Jarosław KALINOWSKI | EPP | 104216 |
| 6.1. Witold Jan WASZCZYKOWSKI | $\begin{array}{r} 16802 \\ 1 \end{array}$ | 6.1. Marek BeLKA | S\&D | 182517 |
| 6.2. Joanna KOPCIŃSKA | $\begin{array}{r} 13035 \\ 8 \end{array}$ | 7.1. Ewa KOPACZ EPP |  | 252032 |
| 7.1. Zdzisław KRASNODĘBSKI | $\begin{array}{r} 16403 \\ 4 \end{array}$ | 7.2. Leszek MILLER S\&D |  | 79380 |
| 7.2. Andżelika Anna MożDŻANOWSKA | 76953 | 8.1. Krzysztof Hetman | EPP | 105908 |
| 8.1. Beata MAZUREK | $\begin{array}{r} 20469 \\ 3 \end{array}$ | 9.1. Elżbieta Katarzyna ŁUKACIJEWSKA | EPP | 40737 |
| 8.2. Elżbieta Kruk | $\begin{array}{r} 16410 \\ 8 \end{array}$ | 10.1. Róża Thun und Hohenstein | EPP | 221279 |
| 9.1. Tomasz Piotr PORĘBA | $\begin{array}{r} 27601 \\ 4 \end{array}$ | 10.2. Adam JARUBAS EPP |  | 138854 |
| 9.2. Bogdan RzOŃCA | 64113 | 11.1. Jerzy BuZEK EPP |  | 422445 |
| 10.1. Beata SzYDŁo | $\begin{array}{r} 52581 \\ 1 \\ \hline \end{array}$ | 11.2. Jan OLBRYCHT EPP |  | 69009 |
| 10.2. Patryk JAKI | $\begin{array}{r} 25836 \\ 6 \end{array}$ | 11.3. Marek Paweł BALT S\&D |  | 45043 |
| 10.3. Ryszard Antoni LeGUTKO | 65710 | 12.1. Janina OchoJSKA EPP |  | 307227 |
| +10.4. Dominik TARCZYŃSKI | 41912 | 12.2. Jarosław DuDA EPP |  | 77611 |
| 11.1. Jadwiga WIŚNIEWSKA | $\begin{array}{r} 40937 \\ 3 \end{array}$ | 13.1. Bartosz ArŁukowicz | EPP | 239893 |
| 11.2. Izabela-Helena KıOC | 78352 | 13.2. Bogusław LIBERADZKI | S\&D | 99897 |
| 11.3. Grzegorz TOBISZOWSKI | 65007 | Wiosna |  |  |
| 12.1. Beata KEMPA | $\begin{array}{r} 20930 \\ 5 \end{array}$ | 4.1. Robert BIEDRON |  | 96388 |
| 12.2. Anna ZALEWSKA | $\begin{array}{r} 16833 \\ 7 \end{array}$ | 7.1. Sylwia Spurek |  | 55306 |
| 13.1.Joachim Stanisław BrUDZIŃSKI | $\begin{array}{r} 18516 \\ 8 \end{array}$ | 11.1.Łukasz KOHUT |  | 48783 |

### 3.23. PT - Portuguese Republic

Portugal is allocated a contingent of twenty-one seats. Political parties had to register their lists of nominees with the Constitutional Court until 41 days before election day. Voters cast a single vote for a closed list of a party. Ballot sheets impress by their heavy party emphasis. For every party they give the full name, plus the party acronym, plus the party emblem. Names of candidates do not appear on the ballot sheet.

Table 3.23.1: Portugal, base data.

| EP2019PT-1 | 21 |
| :--- | :--- |
| Seat contingent | 10757192 |
| Electorate | 1 |
| Constituencies | LV0 |
| Vote pattern | none |
| Electoral threshold | 17 |
| Apportionment parties | 3078901 |
| Effective votes | DivDwn |
| Apportionment method | Dis female +272 male $=490$ |
| Candidates admitted | 210 female +11 male $=21$ |
| MEPs gender |  |

There is no electoral threshold. The apportionment of seats among parties uses the divisor method with downward rounding (DivDwn). Every 112000 votes justify roughly one seat. Of the seventeen parties eleven fail to win a seat.

Table 3.23.2: Portugal, from votes to seats.

| EP2019PT-2 | Votes | Quotient <br> [Divisor] | Seats <br> (DivDwn) | Political <br> Group |
| :--- | ---: | :---: | :---: | :--- |
| PS | 1104694 | 9.9 | 9 | S\&D |
| PSD | 725399 | 6.5 | 6 | EPP |
| B.E. | 325093 | 2.9 | 2 | GUE/NGL |
| CDU (PCP + PEV) | 228045 | 2.04 | 2 | GUE/NGL |
| CDS-PP | 204792 | 1.8 | 1 | EPP |
| PAN | 168015 | 1.5 | 1 | Greens/EFA |
| 11 Others | 322863 | - | 0 |  |
| Sum | $\mathbf{3 0 7 8 9 0 1}$ | $\mathbf{[ 1 1 2} \mathbf{0 0 0 ]}$ | $\mathbf{2 1}$ |  |

The assignment of seats to candidates follows the list order, as is characteristic of closed list systems.
Table 3.23.3: Portugal, from seats to MEPs.

| EP2019PT-3 | 6. Sara CERDAS | 3. José Manuel FERNANDES | CDU (PCP + PEV) |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| PS | 7. Carlos ZORRINHO | 4. Maria Da Graça CARVALHO | 1. João FERREIRA |
| 1. Pedro MARQUES | 8. Isabel SANTOS | 5. Álvaro AMARO | 2. Sandra PEREIRA |
| 2. Maria Manuel LEITÃO MARQUES | 9. Manuel PIZARRO | 6. Cláudia MONTEIRO DE AGUIAR | CDS-PP |
| 3. Pedro SILVA PEREIRA | PSD | B.E. | 1. Nuno MELO |
| 4. Margarida MARQUES | 1.Paulo RANGEL | 1.Marisa MATIAS | PAN |
| 10. ${ }^{\text {I } \text { Isabel CARVALHAIS }}$ | 2.Lidia PEREIRA | 2. José GUSMÄO | 1. Francisco GUERREIRO |

${ }^{\text {a }}$ ) Isabel CARVALHAIS incoming for André BRADFORD (list place 5).

### 3.24. RO - Romania

Romania has a seat contingent of thirty-two seats which, after the UK left the EU, was raised by one seat. The law stipulates that no list of nominees of a party may consist of male candidates only. Candidates' proposals had to be submitted to the constituency offices at the latest 40 days before the election date. Every voter receives a stamp and a ballot booklet with the lists of candidates of all parties. Voters print the stamp next to the party of their choice.

Table 3.24.1: Romania, base data.

| EP2019RO-1 |  |
| :--- | :--- |
| Seat contingent | $32+1$ |
| Electorate | 18267256 |
| Constituencies | 1 |
| Vote pattern | LV0 |
| Valid votes | 9352472 |
| Parties admitted | 13, plus 3 independent candidates |
| Electoral threshold | $467624(=5 \%$ of valid votes for parties only $)$ |
| Apportionment parties | 6 |
| Effective votes | 8100866 |
| Apportionment method | DivDwn |
| Candidates admitted | 150 female +334 male $=484$ |
| MEPs gender | 7 female +25 male $=32$ |

For parties there is a threshold of five per cent of the valid votes: $5 \%$ of $9352472=467624$. For independent candidates the threshold is equal to the ratio of valid votes to seats: 9352472 / $32=$ 292 265. Seven parties and all independent candidates fail their threshold. This leaves six parties to participate in the seat apportionment process. The divisor method with downward rounding is used (DivDwn). After the UK left the EU the thirty-third seat is allotted to PSD (divisor 226000).

Table 3.24.2: Romania, from votes to seats.

| EP2019RO-2 | Votes | Quotient <br> [Divisor] | Seats <br> (DivDwn) | Political <br> Group |
| :--- | ---: | :---: | :---: | :--- |
| PNL | 2449068 | 10.6 | 10 | EPP |
| PSD | 2040765 | 8.9 | $8+1$ | S\&D |
| 2020 USR Plus | 2028236 | 8.8 | 8 | Renew Europe |
| PPR | 583916 | 2.5 | 2 | S\&D |
| PMP | 522104 | 2.3 | 2 | EPP |
| UDMR | 476777 | 2.1 | 2 | EPP |
| Sum | $\mathbf{8 1 0 0 8 6 6}$ | $[\mathbf{2 3 0} \mathbf{0 0 0 ]}$ | $\mathbf{3 2 + 1}$ |  |

The assignment of seats to candidates follows the prespecified rank-order of the party-lists.
Table 3.24.3: Romania, from seats to MEPs.

| EP2019RO-3 | 9. Cristian-Silviu Buşoı | 8. Adrian-Dragoș Benea | 8. Ramona Strugariu |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| PNL | 10. Marian-Jean Marinescu | +9. Victor Negrescu | PPR |
| 1. Ioan-Rareș BOGDAN | PSD | 2020 USR PLUS | 3. ${ }^{\text {a }}$ Mihai TUDOSE |
| 2. Mircea-Gheorghe Hava | 1. Rovana Plumb | 1. Dacian CIoloș | 2. Corina Crețu |
| 3. Siegfried MUREŞAN | 2. Carmen Avram | 2. Cristian Ghinea | PMP |
| 4. Vasile BLAGA | 3. Claudiu MANDA | 3. Dragoş Pîslaru | 1.Traian BĂSESCU |
| 5. Adina-Loana VĂLEAN | 4. Cristian Terheş | 4. Clotilde ARmAND | 2. Eugen TOMAC |
| 6. Daniel BUDA | 5. Dan NICA | 5. Dragoş Tudorache | UDMR |
| 7. Dan-Ştefan Motreanu | 6. Maria Grapini | 6. Nicolae ŞTEFĂNUȚĂ | 1. Iuliu Winkler |
| 8. Gheorghe FALCĂ | 7. Tudor Ciuhodaru | 7. Vlad-Marius Bотоs | 2. Loránt VINCZE |

${ }^{\text {a }}$ ) Mihai TUDOSE incoming for Victor PONTA (list place 1).

### 3.25. SE - Kingdom of Sweden

Sweden has a seat contingent of twenty seats which, after the UK left the EU, was raised by one seat. The Election Authority must have received parties' notification no later than 30 days before election day. Eleven parties contested the election, with a total of 574 candidates. Every party has its own ballot paper. Voters cast a party vote, and may adjoin one preference vote for one of the party's candidate.

Table 3.25.1: Sweden, base data.

| EP2019SE-1 |  |
| :--- | :--- |
| Seat contingent | $20+1$ |
| Electorate | 7576917 |
| Constituencies | 1 |
| Vote pattern | LV1 |
| Valid votes | 4151470 |
| Parties admitted | 11 |
| Electoral threshold | 166059 ( $=4 \%$ of valid votes $)$ |
| Apportionment parties | 8 |
| Effective votes | 4047710 |
| Apportionment method | Div0.6 |
| Preference vote hurdle | $5 \%$ bypass rule |
| Candidates admitted | 237 female +337 male $=574$ |
| MEPs gender | 11 female +9 male $=20$ |

The electoral threshold is four per cent of the valid votes (166059), it was passed by eight parties. The apportionment of seats among parties uses Div0.6, the Swedish modification of the divisor method with standard rounding (DivStd). Themodification differs from DivStd for a quotient smaller than one, by rounding it upwards only when larger than 0.6 (not just larger than 0.5 as with DivStd). With the 2019 data the party with the fewest votes has quotient 0.9 , which is rounded upwards by both methods, Div0.6 and DivStd. Every 195000 votes justify roughly one seat. After the UK leaves the EU, with key 190 000, the additional seat is allotted to MP.

Table 3.25.2: Sweden, from votes to seats.

| EP2019SE-2 | Votes | Quotient <br> [Divisor] | Seats <br> (Div0.6) | Political <br> Group |
| :--- | ---: | :---: | :---: | :--- |
| S | 974589 | 5.0 | 5 | S\&D |
| M | 698770 | 3.6 | 4 | EPP |
| SD | 636877 | 3.3 | 3 | ECR |
| MP | 478258 | 2.45 | $2+1$ | Greens/EFA |
| C | 447641 | 2.3 | 2 | Renew Europe |
| KD | 357856 | 1.8 | 2 | EPP |
| V | 282300 | 1.4 | 1 | GUE/NGL |
| L(FP) | 171419 | 0.9 | 1 | Renew Europe |
| Sum | $\mathbf{4 0 4 7 7 1 0}$ | $\mathbf{[ 1 9 5} \mathbf{0 0 0 ]}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 + 1}$ |  |

Preference votes are incorporated through a five per cent bypass rule. That is, when the preference vote tally of a candidate meets or exceeds five per cent of the number of votes for his or her party, the candidate takes precedence in the seat assignment stage. These candidates are elected in order of their personal vote tallies, while their list places are ignored.

For candidates below the bypass hurdle, preference votes are ignored; they are elected in the rankorder of their list places. ${ }^{16}$ With the data at hand candidates who overcome the bypass hurdle finish

[^9]in a sequence identical to their list places. Hence, retrospectively, incorporation of preference votes is concordant with the preordained rank-order of the party-lists; party-lists prevail as is.

Table 3.25.3: Sweden, from seats to MEPs.

| EP2019SE-3 | List Plac e | Preferenc <br> Votes |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\begin{gathered} \text { S (Bypass hurdle: } 5 \% \text { of } 974589= \\ 48730 \text { ) } \end{gathered}$ |  |  |
| 1. Heléne Fritzon | 4 | 73929 |
| 2. Johan DANIELSSON | 2 | 40.136 |
| 3. Jytte GUtELAND | 3 | 42617 |
| 4. Erik BERGKVIST | 4 | 17117 |
| 5. Evin INCIR | 5 | 9.479 |
| M (Bypass hurdle: $5 \%$ of $698770=$34939 ) |  |  |
| 1.Tomas Tobé | 4 | 150726 |
| 2. Jessica Polfjärd | 2 | 17945 |
| 3. Jörgen Warborn | 3 | 13503 |
| 4. Arba Kokalari | 4 | 10284 |
| SD (Bypass hurdle: $5 \%$ of $636877=$ 31 844) |  |  |
| 1. Peter LUNDGREN | 7 | 87384 |
| 2. Jessica Stegrud | z | 41202 |
| 3. Charlie Weimers | 3 | 30668 |
| MP (Bypass hurdle: $5 \%$ of $478258=$23913 ) |  |  |
| 1. Alice Bah Kuhnke | 4 | 141106 |
| 2. Pär Holmgren | z | 73120 |
| +3. Jakop DALUNDE | 3 | 12098 |
| C (Bypass hurdle:5\% of $447641=$22383 ) |  |  |
| 1. Fredrick Federley | 4 | 108240 |
| 2. Abir AL-SAHLANI | 2 | 6352 |
| KD (Bypass hurdle: $5 \%$ of $357856=$ 17893) |  |  |
| 1. Sara SKYTTEDAL | 4 | 74325 |
| 2. David LEGA | $z$ | 27862 |
| V (Bypass hurdle: 5\% of $282300=$ 14 115) |  |  |
| 1. Malin BJÖRK | 4 | 63264 |
| $\mathrm{L}(\mathrm{FP}) \quad$ (Bypass hurdle: $5 \%$ of $171419=$8571 ) |  |  |
| 1. Karin KarLsbro | 7 | 15826 |

Laia Saumell (2019): The method of Eneström and Phragmén for parliamentary elections by means of approval voting, arxiv.org/abs/1907.10590. For the present data the results agree with the rank-orders of the party-lists.

### 3.26. SI - Republic of Slovenia

Slovenia is allocated a contingent of eight seats. Lists of candidates had to be submitted to the National Electoral Commission no later than thirty days before election day. Fourteen parties contested the election, with a total of 103 candidates. Every party-list is obliged to include at least forty per cent female candidates. There is a single ballot paper showing all parties and all candidates. Voters circle a party's serial number, and may add one preference vote for a specific candidate. In 2019 the ballot paper had grown to A2 size.

Table 3.26.1 : Slovenia, base data.

| EP2019SI-1 |  |
| :--- | :--- |
| Seat contingent | 8 |
| Electorate | 1704866 |
| Constituencies | 1 |
| Vote pattern | LV1 |
| Valid votes | 482075 |
| Parties admitted | 14 |
| Electoral threshold | $19283(=4 \%$ of valid votes $)$ |
| Apportionment parties | 8 |
| Effective votes | 441550 |
| Apportionment method | DivDwn |
| Preference vote hurdle | Quorum bypass rule |
| Candidates admitted | 51 female +52 male $=103$ |
| MEPs gender | 4 female +4 male $=8$ |

There is an electoral threshold of four per cent of valid votes, 19283. The threshold removes six parties, leaving eight apportionment parties. The apportionment of seats among parties uses the divisor method with downwardrounding (DivDwn). Every 34000 votes justify roughly one seat.

Table 3.26.2: Slovenia, from votes to seats.

| EP2019SI-2 | Votes | Quotient <br> [Divisor] | Seats <br> (DivDwn) | Political <br> Group |
| :--- | ---: | :---: | :---: | :--- |
| SDS+SLS | 126534 | 3.7 | 3 | EPP |
| SD | 89936 | 2.6 | 2 | S\&D |
| LMŠ | 74431 | 2.2 | 2 | Renew Europe |
| NSi | 53621 | 1.6 | 1 | EPP |
| 4 Others | 97028 | - | 0 |  |
| Sum | $\mathbf{4 4 1 5 5 0}$ | $[\mathbf{3 4} \mathbf{0 0 0 ]}$ | $\mathbf{8}$ |  |

For assigning seats to candidates, preference votes may overrule the rank-order of the corresponding party-list by way of a quorum bypass rule. The quorum is one half of the quotient of the party's vote count and the number of its list candidates. All four parties that are apportioned one or more seats nominate eight candidates. Hence the quorum requires one half of one eighth of the party's vote count, $1 / 16=6.25 \%$, which constitutes a rather low hurdle. Indeed, all MEPs are elected through their preference votetallies.

Table 3.26.3: Slovenia, from seats to MEPs.

| EP2019SI-3 | List Place | Preference <br> Votes |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| SDS+SLS (Bypass hurdle: $1 ⁄ 2 \cdot 126534 / 8=7908$ ) |  |  |
| 1. Romana TOMC | $z$ | 40668 |
| 2. Milan Zver | 4 | 26674 |
| 3. Franc Bogovič | 4 | 13743 |
| SD $\begin{gathered}\text { (Bypass hurdle: } 1 / 2 / 29936 / 8= \\ 5621 \text { ) }\end{gathered}$ |  |  |
| 1.Tanja FAJON | 7 | 54651 |
| 2. Milan Brglez | 4 | 7152 |
| LMŠ (Bypass hurdle: $1 / 2 \cdot 74431 / 8=$ |  |  |
| 1. Irena Joveva | 4 | 42190 |
| 2. Klemen Grošed | $z$ | 6494 |
| NSi $\begin{gathered}\text { (Bypass hurdle: } 1 / 2 \cdot 53621 / 8= \\ 3351 \text { ) }\end{gathered}$ |  |  |
| 1.Ljudmila Novak | 7 | 19558 |

### 3.27. SK - Slovak Republic

Slovakia has a seat contingent of thirteen seats which, after the UK left the EU, was raised by one seat. Candidates must register not later than 45 days before polling day. Every party has its own ballot paper. Voters cast a list vote for a party, and may circle the serial number of up to two candidates to express their preferences for specific candidates.

Table 3.27.1 : Slovakia, base data.

| EP2019SK-1 |  |
| :--- | :--- |
| Seat contingent | $13+1$ |
| Electorate | 4429801 |
| Constituencies | 1 |
| Vote pattern | LV2 |
| Votes cast | 1006351 |
| Parties admitted | 31 |
| Electoral threshold | 50318 ( $=5 \%$ of valid cast $)$ |
| Apportionment parties | 6 |
| Effective votes | 714507 |
| Apportionment method | DQ3grR |
| Preference vote hurdle | Quorum bypass rule |
| Candidates admitted | 74 female +275 male $=349$ |
| MEPs gender | 2 female +11 male $=13$ |

There is an electoral threshold of five per cent of the valid votes ( 50318 ). Six parties pass the threshold, with a total of 714507 effective votes. The apportionment of the fourteen seats after the UK leaves the EU uses the Droop-quota variant-3 method with fit by greatest remainders. Variant-3 of the Droop-quota is the standard rounding of the quotient of effective votes and seat total plus one, 714507 / $15=47634$. That is, every 47634 votes justify roughly one seat.

Table 3.27.2: Slovakia, from votes to seats.

| EP2019SK-2 | Votes | Quotient <br> [Split] | Seats <br> (DQ3grR) | Political <br> Group |
| :--- | ---: | :---: | :---: | :--- |
| Coal. PS + SPOLU | 198255 | 4.2 | 4 | (see Table 3.27.3) |
| SMER-SD | 154996 | 3.3 | 3 | S\&D |
| SNS | 118995 | 2.498 | 2 | NI |
| KDH | 95588 | 2.007 | 2 | EPP |
| SaS | 94839 | 1.991 | 2 | ECR |
| OL'ANO | 51834 | 1.1 | 1 | EPP |
| Sum | $\mathbf{7 1 4 5 0 7}$ | $[.5]$ | $\mathbf{1 4}$ |  |

The assignment of seats to candidates is dominated by preference votes. A quorum bypass rule is employed, where the quorum is three per cent of the party's vote total.

Table 3.27.3: Slovakia, from seats to MEPs.

| EP 2019SK-3 |  |  | Candidat |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Plac | e |
|  |  | e | Votes |
| Coal. PS + SPOLU | (Bypas hurdle: $3 \%$ of $198255=$ 5948) |  |  |
| 2. Michal WIEZIK EPP | Renew Europe | 7 | 81735 |
|  |  | 7 | 29998 |
| 3. Martin Hossík <br> 4. Vladimír BILČík EPP | Renew Europe | 6 | 27549 |
|  |  | $z$ | 26202 |
| SMER-SD | $\begin{aligned} & \text { (Bypas hurdle: } 3 \% \text { of } 154996= \\ & 4650 \text { ) } \end{aligned}$ |  |  |
| 1. Monika Beñová |  | 7 | 89472 |
| 2. Miroslav Čiż |  | z | 51362 |
| 3. Robert HAJŠEL |  | 3 | 13773 |
| SNS | (Bypas hurdle: $3 \%$ of $118995=$ 3 570) |  |  |
| 1. Milan UhRík |  | 14 | 42779 |
| 2. Miroslav RADAČOVSKY |  | 3 | 42276 |
| KDH | (Bypas hurdle: 3\% of 95588 = 2 868) |  |  |
| 1. Ivan ŠTEFANEC |  | 7 | 33128 |
| +2. Miriam LEXMANN |  | z | 27833 |
| SaS | (Bypas hurdle:3\% of $94839=$ 2846) |  |  |
| 1. Lucia ĎURİŠ Nicholsonová |  | 3 | 52331 |
| 2. Eugen JurzyCa |  | 7 | 33540 |
| OL'ANO | $\begin{aligned} & \text { (Bypas hurdle: } 3 \% \text { of } 51834= \\ & 1556 \text { ) } \end{aligned}$ |  |  |
| 1.Peter Pollák |  | 3 | 23815 |

According to domestic provisions the party whose quotient has the smallest remainder (KDH, with remainder .007 ) had to wait until after the UK left the EU before seating its last candidate (Miriam Lexmann).

The provision caused a discordant apportionment of the thirteen seats while the UK was in the EU. KDH attracts more votes than SaS ( 95588 versus 94839 ), but is allotted fewer seats (one versus two). The discordance would have been avoided if the domestic provisions had targeted the party with the smallest remainder not of all quotients, but only of those that are rounded upwards (SaS, with remainder .991).

### 3.28. UK - United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

The United Kingdom was allocated a contingent of seventy-three seats which, after the UK left the EU, were vacated. Registration of parties and candidates had to be submitted by the nineteenth working day before election day.

Table 3.28.1: United Kingdom, base data.

| EP2019UK-1 |  |
| :--- | :--- |
| Seat contingent | 73 |
| Electorate | 46534897 |
| Constituencies | 12 |
| Vote pattern | LV0, STV |
| Electoral threshold | none |
| Apportionment parties | 23, plus 24 independent candidates |
| Effective votes | 1719012 |
| Apportionment method | DivDwn, STVfra |
| Candidates admitted | $239+364=603$ |
| MEPs gender | 34 female, 39 male $=73$ |

Domestic provisions establish twelve constituencies to which the seats are passed on as follows:

1. East Midlands -5 seats,
2. East of England -7 seats,
3. London-8seats,
4. North East England - 3 seats,
5. North West England - 8 seats,
6. South East England - 10 seats,
7. South West England and Gibraltar -6 seats,
8. West Midlands -7 seats,
9. Yorkshire and the Humber -6 seats,
10. Wales -4 seats,
11. Scotland -6 seats,
12. Northern Ireland -3 seats.

In all constituencies except the last, Northern Ireland, parties register closed lists, and voters cast a single list vote. The results are evaluated using the divisor method with downward rounding (DivDwn), separately in every constituency. Therefore the electoral key varies from constituency to constituency. In Constituency 3, London, every 200000 votes justify roughly one seat, in Constituency 4, North East England, it is every 110000 votes.
The Northern Ireland constituency employs a single transferable vote scheme with fractional vote transfers (STVfra). Voters express their preferences by writing 1 next to the candidate of their first choice, 2 next to the candidate of their second choice, and so on. The quorum that is needed to be assigned a seat is the Droop-quota, 572 447/4 = 143112 votes. No candidate reaches the quorum with their first preferences. Hence lower ranked candidates are successively eliminated and their votes are transferred to the remaining candidates. In count 3, Diane DodDs is first to be assigned a seat, followed in count 5 by Naomi Long and Martina Anderson.

Table 3.28.2: United Kingdom, from votes to seats.

| EP2019UK-2 | Votes | Quotien t [Divisor] | Seats (DivDwn ) |  | Votes | Quotien [Divisor] | Seats (DivDwn ) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1. East Midlands |  |  |  | 2. East of England |  |  |  |
| Brexit | 452321 | 3.2 | 3 | Brexit | 604715 | 3.8 | 3 |
| LibDem | 203989 | 1.5 | 1 | LibDem | 361563 | 2.3 | 2 |
| Labour | 164682 | 1.2 | 1 | Labour | 139490 | 0.9 | 0 |
| Green | 124630 | 0.9 | 0 | Green | 202460 | 1.3 | 1 |
| Conservative | 126138 | 0.9 | 0 | Conservative | 163830 | 1.02 | 1 |
| 4 Others | 111467 | - | 0 | 4 Others | 116808 | - | 0 |
| Sum | 1183227 | [140 000] | 5 | Sum | 1588866 | [160 000] | 7 |
| 3. London |  |  |  | 4. North East England |  |  |  |
| Brexit | 400257 | 2.001 | 2 | Brexit | 240056 | 2.2 | 2 |
| LibDem | 608725 | 3.04 | 3 | LibDem | 104330 | 0.9 | 0 |
| Labour | 536810 | 2.7 | 2 | Labour | 119931 | 1.1 | 1 |
| Green | 278957 | 1.4 | 1 | Green | 49905 | 0.5 | 0 |
| Conservative | 177964 | 0.9 | 0 | Conservative | 42395 | 0.4 | 0 |
| 11 Others | 238968 | - | 0 | 2 Others | 63237 | - | 0 |
| Sum | 2241681 | [200 000] | 8 | Sum | 619854 | [110 000] | 3 |
| 5. North West England |  |  |  | 6. South East England |  |  |  |
| Brexit | 541843 | 3.9 | 3 | Brexit | 915686 | 4.98 | 4 |
| LibDem | 297507 | 2.1 | 2 | LibDem | 653743 | 3.6 | 3 |
| Labour | 380193 | 2.7 | 2 | Labour | 184678 | 1.004 | 1 |
| Green | 216581 | 1.5 | 1 | Green | 343249 | 1.9 | 1 |
| Conservative | 131002 | 0.9 | 0 | Conservative | 260277 | 1.4 | 1 |
| 9 Others | 167781 | - | 0 | 7 Others | 181312 | - | 0 |
| Sum | 1734907 | [140 000] | 8 | Sum | 2538945 | [184 000] | 10 |
| 7. South West England and Gibraltar |  |  |  | 8: West Midlands |  |  |  |
| Brexit | 611742 | 3.6 | 3 | Brexit | 507152 | 3.9 | 3 |
| LibDem | 385095 | 2.3 | 2 | LibDem | 219982 | 1.7 | 1 |
| Labour | 108100 | 0.6 | 0 | Labour | 228298 | 1.8 | 1 |
| Green | 302364 | 1.8 | 1 | Green | 143520 | 1.1 | 1 |
| Conservative | 144674 | 0.9 | 0 | Conservative | 135279 | 1.04 | 1 |
| 6 Others | 114654 | - | 0 | 2 Others | 112607 | - | 0 |
| Sum | 1666629 | [170 000] | 6 | Sum | 1346838 | [130 000] | 7 |
| 9. Yorkshire and the Humber |  |  |  | 10. Wales |  |  |  |
| Brexit | 470351 | 3.4 | 3 | Brexit | 271404 | 2.3 | 2 |
| LibDem | 200180 | 1.4 | 1 | LibDem | 113885 | 0.9 | 0 |
| Labour | 210516 | 1.5 | 1 | Labour | 127833 | 1.1 | 1 |
| Green | 166980 | 1.2 | 1 | Green | 52660 | 0.4 | 0 |
| Conservative | 92863 | 0.7 | 0 | Conservative | 54587 | 0.5 | 0 |
| 4 Others | 148387 | - | 0 | Plaid Cymru | 163928 | 1.4 | 1 |
|  |  |  |  | 2 Others | 51898 | - | 0 |
| Sum | 1289277 | [140 000] | 6 | Sum | 836195 | [120 000] | 4 |
| 11. Scotland |  |  |  | 12. Northern Ireland (1st preference votes, STVfra) |  |  |  |
| Brexit | 233006 | 1.4 | 1 | 1. Diane Dodd |  | DUP | 124991 |
| LibDem | 218285 | 1.3 | 1 | 2. Naomi Long |  | APNI | 105928 |
| Labour | 146724 | 0.9 | 0 | 3. Martina AN |  | SF | 126951 |
| SNP | 594553 | 3.5 | 3 | Colum EASTWO |  | SDLP | 78589 |
| Conservative | 182476 | 1.1 | 1 | Jim Allister |  | TUV | 62021 |
| Scottish Grn | 129603 | 0.8 | 0 | Danny Kenned |  | UUP | 53052 |
| 4 Others | 66599 |  |  | 5 Others |  |  | 20915 |
| Sum | 1571246 | [170 000] | 6 | Sum |  |  | 572447 |

All in all, the Brexit Party (Political Group NI) finishes with twenty-nine seats, the Liberal Democrats (Renew Europe) with sixteen, the Labour Party (S\&D) with ten, the Green Party of England and Wales
(Greens/EFA) with seven, the Conservative Party (ECR) with four, the Scottish National Party (Greens/EFA) with three, and Plaid Cymru (Greens/EFA), Sinn Féin (GUE/NGL), the Democratic Unionist Party (NI) and the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (Renew Europe) with one seat each.

Seats are assigned to candidates in the rank-order of the party-lists of their constituencies, with the exception of Northern Ireland where seats are assigned according to the STV scheme.

Table 3.28.3: United Kingdom, from seats to MEPs.

| EP2019UK-3 | 7.3. Christina JORDAN | 6.3. Judith BuNTING | 6.1. Alexandra PHILLIPS |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Brexit Party | 8.1. Rupert LOWE | 7.1. Caroline VOADEN | 7.1. Molly SCOTT CATO |
| 1.1. Annunziata ReES-MOGG | 8.2. Martin DAUBNEY | 7.2. Martin HORWOOD | 8.1. Ellie CHOWNS |
| 1.2. Jonathan BuLLOCK | 8.3. Andrew ENGLAND KERR | 8.1. Phil BENNION | 9.1. Magid MAGID |
| 1.3. Matthew PATIEN | 9.1. John LONGWORTH | 9.1. Shaffaq MOHAMMED | Conservative |
| 2.1. Richard TICE | 9.2. Lucy HARRIS | 12.1. Sheila RITCHIE | 2.1. Geoffrey VAN ORDEN |
| 2.2. Michael HEAVER | 9.3. Jake PUGH | Labour | 6.1. Daniel HANNAN |
| 2.3. June Alison MummERY | 10.1. Nathan GILL | 1.1. Rory PALMER | 8.1. Anthea MCINTYRE |
| 3.1. Ben HABIB | 10.2. James WELLS | 3.1. Claude MORAES | 12.1. Nosheena MOBARIK |
| 3.2. Lance FORMAN | 12.1. Louis STEDMAN-BRYCE | 3.2. Seb DANCE | SNP |
| 4.1. Brian MONTEITH | LibDem | 4.1. Jude KIRTON-DARLING | 11.1. Alyn SmITH |
| 4.2. John TENNANT | 1.1. Bill NeWTON DUNN | 5.1. Theresa GRIFFIN | 11.2. Christian ALLARD |
| 5.1. Claire FOX | 2.1. Barbara GIBSON | 5.2. Julie WARD | 11.3. Aileen MCLEOD |
| 5.2. Henrik NIELSEN | 2.2. Lucy NETHSINGHA | 6.1. John HOWARTH | Plaid Cymru |
| 5.3. David BULL | 3.1. Irina VON WIESE | 8.1. Neena GILL | 10.1. Jill EVANS |
| 6.1. Nigel FARAGE | 3.2. Dinesh DHAMIJA | 9.1. Richard CORBETT | Sinn Féin |
| 6.2. Alexandra PHILLIPS | 3.3. Luisa PORRITT | 10.1. Jackie JONES | 12. Martina ANDERSON |
| 6.3. Robert ROWLAND | 5.1. Chris DAVIES | Greens | DUP |
| 6.4. Belinda DE LUCY | 5.2. Jane BROPHY | 2.1. Catherine ROWEIT | 12. Diane DODDS |
| 7.1. Ann WIDDECOMBE | 6.1. Catherine BEARDER | 3.1. Scott AINSLIE | APNI |
| 7.2. James GLANCY | 6.2. Antony HOOK | 5.1. Gina DOWDING | 12. Naomi LONG |

## 4. Citizens and representatives from a Union-wide viewpoint

Ever since its inception theEP has expressedits intention to unify the procedures which the Member States employ at EP elections. The present paper focusses on counting ballots, evaluating vote counts, and assigning seats to candidates. Electoral systems comprise more than these procedural rules. They determine who stands at the election, how they register, if they are given access to the media, whether they are reimbursed for their expenses, which ballot design is submitted to the voters and much more. Yet, even when the view is narrowed down to how votes are translated into seats, the electoral provisions in the twenty-eight MemberStates constitute a perplexing multitude.

The 2019 European elections are not readily amenable to a Union-wide re-evaluation. The reason is the lack of visibility of political parties at the European level. European parties which are visibly functioning at the Union level would give rise to a political system in which the many domestic parties would be able to find their place. Such a scenario does not apply to the 2019 elections.

Even so, it is tempting to view the European elections 2019 from a unified standpoint. To this end we replace the almost invisible European parties by the visible Political Groups in the EP. In DE, ES, NL, PL and SI some parties split their seats between several Political Groups; we split their votes accordingly. In IE, MT, and the Northern Ireland region of the UK, where STV schemes are used, we aggregate only first preferences. Domestic parties not affiliated to a Political Group nor obtaining a seat, labelled in our tables as 'Others', are omitted. By adding the vote counts for the domestic parties who joined a Political Group 'hypothetical votes' are generated. The hypothetical votes provide the basis to apportion the 748 EP seats among the Political Groups. Every 236000 votes justify roughly one seat, see Table 4.1.

Table 4.1: Political Groups in the EP, actual size versus hypothetical seats.

| Political Group | Actual <br> Size | Hypothetical <br> Votes | Quotient <br> [Divisor] | Hypothetical <br> Seats (DivStd) | Discrepancy |
| :--- | :---: | ---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| EPP | 182 | 39665362 | 168.1 | 168 | 14 |
| S\&D | 154 | 36585197 | 155.0 | 155 | -1 |
| RenewEurope | 108 | 23466081 | 99.4 | 99 | 9 |
| Greens/EFA | 74 | 19804837 | 83.9 | 84 | -10 |
| ID | 73 | 20837020 | 88.3 | 88 | -15 |
| ECR | 62 | 14537613 | 61.6 | 62 | 0 |
| GUE/NGL | 41 | 10134340 | 42.9 | 43 | -2 |
| NI | 54 | $11455 \mathbf{2 8 0}$ | 48.54 | 49 | 5 |
| Sum | $\mathbf{7 4 8}$ | $\mathbf{1 7 6 4 8 5} \mathbf{7 3 0}$ | $[\mathbf{2 3 6} \mathbf{0 0 0 ]}$ | $\mathbf{7 4 8}$ | $\mathbf{0}$ |

While a single Union-wide apportionment would faithfully reflect the political division of the Union's electorate, it would miss out on the geographical dimension of the Union being composed of 28 Member States. Therefore, it is important to realise that divisor methods allow a double proportional variant that honours both dimensions simultaneously: the geographical distribution of the Union's citizens across MemberStates, and the political division of the electorate as expressed by their votes for parties and candidates. Double proportionality is a powerful concept that would allow the EP to improve the design of the European elections according to the political objectives set by parliament, e.g. by maintaining degressive representation of Member States, or by introducing transnational lists, or by incorporating other desirable features. ${ }^{17}$

[^10]
## 5. Conclusion

The normative link between a common electoral system in all Member States and the democratic legitimacy of the EU was made from the early days of European integration. Both from a legal and a political perspective, alignment between national electoral laws, or their replacement through common provisions based on EU law, was seen as a prerequisite for making the ECSC, the EEC, the EC and then the EU a political community directly involving their citizens. In fact, the Electoral Act of 1976 was seen by contemporaries as a transitional arrangement to organise the first direct elections. ${ }^{18}$

Electoral law is notoriously difficult to amend, at all levels of governance. The 1976 Act has been modified only once, in 2002. A second amendment introducing an electoral threshold at the European level, adopted in July 2018, will enter into force once the approval of all Member States according to their constitutional requirements has been notified to the Council Secretariat. As of 16 October 2019, Germany, Spain and Cyprus still had to notify theiragreement. ${ }^{19}$

This study demonstrates yet again, for the 2019 European elections, that the variations between the 28 national laws governing the European elections are important: we observe the existence of electoral thresholds in some Member States but not in others; if they are applied the percentages also differ; we observe nine different apportionment methods to transform votes into seats; we also observe different rules concerning candidates' gender balance, the deadlines for party or candidate registration, and the options for preference votes.

Such variations may seem innocuous. The differences of outcome of the different apportionment methods, for instance, may appear negligible to non-specialists of electoral procedure. However, electoral thresholds or different list systems have profound effects on the number of effective votes and the success rate for individual candidates in a given Member State. Moreover, one reason for introducing direct elections to the EP was to enable a proportional Europe-wide reflection of different political ideologies and to allow citizens to have an impact on the basic direction the EU (or its predecessors) should take. Academic literature on the Europeanisation of EP elections has been growing for a long time and there is also an important body of case law rendered by different constitutional courts. Both are generally rather sceptical of the democratic weight of the EP, particularly in comparison to national parliaments. Academics have providednumerous analyses of the second-order nature of European elections, concluding that their objective is only partially to determine EU-wide policies or to hold EU leaders to account. They are often an interim assessment of the performance of thenational government of the day, thus weakening the link between citizens and the institutions of the EU, and in particular, the link between voters and the EP.

Some courts, particularly the German Federal Constitutional Court, have on several occasions critically analysed weaknesses of the European electoral system and arrived at thegeneral appraisal that the EP has little chance ever to provide democratic legitimation at the same level as domestic chambers. Hence the importance of a closelook at the currentstate of affairs, including the technical aspects of the European electoral system. On a positive note, one could consider the different approaches that can be observed in the 28 countries as an opportunity for mutual learning and

[^11]emulation. It is interesting, for instance, that the majority of MemberStates, to varying degrees, offer their citizens the possibility to personalise their voting preferences. Providing this option should increase the average citizen's interest in the European elections. Perhaps even more importantly, personalisation of the vote could contribute to a reduction of the overweening influence of national political parties on the selection of candidates, both when they are initially elected to the EP and when they wish to stand for re-election. It is an obstacle to creating common political awareness at the EU level if electoral campaigns, from posters to TV debates or party manifestos, are dominated by the preferences and calculations of national political leaderships. Having 28 (or 27) national electoral systems, with only some important guidelines being determined at the EU level, also contributes to maintaining among voters narrow national views on EU policies and EU leaders' actions, for instance by minimising the visibility of European party families.

But some political leaders and constitutional scholars are convinced that a higher degree of harmonisation or Europeanisation of the EP elections is a crucial element to improveEU governance and to create political allegiance of European voters to the EU institutions. In earlier pronouncements - for example, in its Maastricht decision of 1993 - the German Federal Constitutional Court had indicated that a common electoral law in all Member States could strengthen the democratic credibility of the EP. ${ }^{20}$ The Conference on the Future of Europe that is currently being prepared will, on the one hand, deal with a host of policy-related issues, such as migration management, future budgetary resources and the fight against global climate change. However, questions such as electoral reform or more effective European political parties are also likely to be prominent on the agenda. ${ }^{21}$ This study aims to provide an informative contribution to these debates, which should come to a preliminary conclusion in 2021, if they are to be considered for application in the 2024 elections.

[^12]
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## 7. Appendix: Acronyms, country codes, party tabs, links

| Acronym | Expansion | Page |
| :--- | :--- | :---: |
| EP | European Parliament | 1 |
| Political | Groups in the EP, see Table 2.4.1 | 9 |
| MEP | Member of the European Parliament | 1 |
| ECSC | European Community of Steal and Coal | 63 |
| EEC | European Economic Community | 63 |
| EC | European Community | 63 |
| EU | European Union | 1 |
| LVx | List vote with one or more ('x') preference votes | 7 |
| xCV | One or more ('x') candidate votes | 8 |
| STV | Vote pattern of single transferable vote schemes |  |
| STVfra | Single transferable vote scheme with fractional transfers | 6 |
| STVran | Single transferable vote scheme with random transfers | 6 |
| UVP | Unused voting power | 25 |
| DivStd | Divisor method with standard rounding | 5 |
| Div0.6 | Swedish modification of the divisor method with standard rounding | 5 |
| DivDwn | Divisor method with downward rounding | 5 |
| HaQgrR | Hare-quota method with fit by greatest remainders | 5 |
| HQ3-EL | Hare-quota variant-3 method with Greek fit | 6 |
| HQxgrR | Hare-quota variant-'x' method with fit by greatest remainders | 5 |
| DQxgrR | Droop-quota variant-'x' method with fit by greatest remainders | 6 |


| Country Code | Short Name | Official Name |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| AT | Austria | Republic of Austria |
| BE | Belgium | Kingdom of Belgium |
| BG | Bulgaria | Republic of Bulgaria |
| CY | Cyprus | Republic of Cyprus |
| CZ | Czechia | Czech Republic |
| DE | Germany | Federal Republic of Germany |
| DK | Denmark | Kingdom of Denmark |
| EE | Estonia | Republic of Estonia |
| EL | Greece | Hellenic Republic |
| ES | Spain | Kingdom of Spain |
| FI | Finland | Republic of Finland |
| FR | France | French Republic |
| HR | Croatia | Republic of Croatia |
| HU | Hungary | Hungary |
| IE | Ireland | Ireland |
| IT | Italy | Italian Republic |
| LT | Lithuania | Republic of Lithuania |
| LU | Luxembourg | Grand Duchy of Luxembourg |
| LV | Latvia | Republic of Latvia |
| MT | Malta | Republic of Malta |
| NL | Netherlands | Kingdom of the Netherlands |
| PL | Poland | Republic of Poland |
| PT | Portugal | Portuguese Republic |
| RO | Romania | Romania |
| SE | Sweden | Kingdom of Sweden |
| SI | Slovenia | Republic of Slovenia |
| SK | Slovakia | Slovak Republic |
| UK | United Kingdom | United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland |
| Source: http://publications.europa.eu/code/en/en-370100.htm (Interinstitutional Style Guide) |  |  |


|  | Party Tab | Party Name |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| AT | ÖVP | Österreichische Volkspartei |
|  | SPÖ | Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreich |
|  | FPÖ | Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs |
|  | GRÜNE | Die Grünen - Die Grüne Alternative |
|  | NEOS | NEOS - Das neue Österreich |
| BE | N-VA | Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie |
|  | VI.Belang | Vlaams Belang |
|  | Open VLD | Open Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten |
|  | CD\&V | Christen-Democratisch \& Vlaams |
|  | Groen | Groen |
|  | sp.a | Socialistische Partij - Anders |
|  | PS | Parti Socialiste |
|  | ECOLO | Ecologistes Confédérés pour l'Organisation de Luttes Originales |
|  | MR | Mouvement Réformateur |
|  | PTB-PVDA | Parti du Travail de Belgique |
|  | PVDA-PTB | Partij van de Arbeidvan België |
|  | cdH | Centre Démocrate Humaniste |
|  | CSP | Christlich Soziale Partei |
| BG | GERB | Coalition Grazhdani za evropeysko razvitie na Balgariya + Sayuz na demokratichnite sili |
|  | BSP | Bulgarska sotsialisticheska partiya |
|  | DPS | Dvizhenie za prava i svobodi |
|  | VMRO | VMRO - Bulgarsko Natsionalno Dvizhenie |
|  | Demokratichna Bulgaria | Demokratichna Bulgaria |
| CY | DISY | Democratic Rally |
|  | AKEL | Progressive Party of Working People |
|  | DIKO | Democratic Party |
|  | EDEK | Movement for Social Democrats EDEK |
| CZ | ANO 2011 | ANO 2011 |
|  | ODS | Občanská demokratická strana |
|  | Piráti | Česká pirátská strana |
|  | TOP $09+$ STAN | STAROSTOVÉ (STAN) s regionálními partnery a TOP 09 |
|  | SPD | Svoboda a prímá demokracie |
|  | KDU-ČSL | Křesṫanská a demokratická unie - Československá strana lidová |
|  | KSČM | Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy |
| DE | CDU | Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands |
|  | GRÜNE | Bündnis 90/Die Grünen |
|  | SPD | Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands |
|  | AfD | Alternative für Deutschland |
|  | CSU | Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern e.V. |
|  | DIE LINKE | DIE LINKE |
|  | FDP | Freie Demokratische Partei |
|  | Die PARTEI | Partei für Arbeit, Rechtsstaat, Tierschutz, Elitenförderung und basisdemokratische Initiative |
|  | FREIE WÄHLER | FREIE WÄHLER |
|  | Tierschutzpartei | PARTEI MENSCH UMWELT TIERSCHUTZ |
|  | ÖDP | Ökologisch-Demokratische Partei |
|  | FAMILIE | Familien-Partei Deutschlands |
|  | VOLT | VOLT |
|  | PIRATEN | Piratenpartei Deutschland |


| DK | V | V - Venstre, DanmarksLiberaleParti |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | A | S - Socialdemokratiet |
|  | F | SF - Socialistisk Folkeparti |
|  | 0 | DF - Dansk Folkeparti |
|  | B | RV - Det Radikale Venstre |
|  | C | KF - Det Konservative Folkeparti |
|  | $\emptyset$ | EL - 'Enhedslisten, deRød - Grønne' |
|  | N | Folkebevægelsen mod EU |
|  | Å | Alternativet |
|  | I | LA - Liberal Alliance |
| EE | RE | Eesti Reformierakond |
|  | SDE | Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Erakond |
|  | KE | Eesti Keskerakond |
|  | EKRE | Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond |
|  | Isamaa | Isamaa Erakond |
| EL | N.D. | New Democracy |
|  | SY.RI.ZA. | Coalition of the Radical Left |
|  | Coal. KINAL | Coalition Movement for Change (Panhellenic Socialist Movement <br> + Democratic Alignment + Movement of Democratic Socialists) |
|  | KKE | Communist Party of Greece |
|  | X.A. | Golden Dawn |
|  | EL | Greek Solution |
| ES | PSOE/PSC | Partido Socialista Obrero Español + Partido de los Socialistas de Cataluña |
|  | PP | Partido Popular |
|  | C's | Ciudadanos - Partido de la Ciudadanía |
|  | Podemos-IU | Coalition Unidas Podemos Cambiar Europa (Unidas Podemos + Izquierda Unida + Catalunya en Comú + Barcelona en Comú) |
|  | VOX | VOX |
|  | Ahora Repúblicas | Coalition Ahora Repúblicas (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya + Euskal Herria Bildu + El Bloque Nacionalista Galego) |
|  | JUNTS | Coalition LLIURES PER EUROPA (Partit Demòcrata Europeu Català + Junts per Catalunya) |
|  | CEUS | Coalition por una Europa Solidaria (Partido Nacionalista Vasco <br> + Coalición Canaria + Compromiso por Galicia + Atarrabia Taldea <br> + Proposta per les Illes Balears y Demòcrates Valencians) |
| FI | KOK | Kansallinen Kokoomus |
|  | VIHR | Vihreä liitto |
|  | SDP | Finlands Socialdemokratiska Parti |
|  | PS | Perussuomalaiset |
|  | KESK | Suomen Keskusta |
|  | VAS | Vasemmistoliitto |
|  | SFP (RKP) | Svenska folkpartiet (Ruotsalainen kansanpuolue) |
| FR | RN | Rassemblement national |
|  | Coal. Renaissance | La Republique En marche! + MoDem + Agir + Mouvement radical, social et libéral |
|  | EELV | Europe écologie - Les verts |
|  | LR | Les Républicains - Union de la droite et du centre |
|  | FI | France insoumise |
|  | Coal. EEES | Coalition Envie d'Europe écologique et sociale (Parti Socialiste + Radicaux de Gauche + Place publique + Nouvelle Donne) |


| HR | Hrvatska demokratska zajednica |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
|  | SDP | Socijaldemokratska partija Hrvatske |
|  | Coalition Hrvatski suverenisti (HRAST - Pokret za uspješnu Hrvatsku <br> + Hrvatska konzervativna stranka - HKS <br> + Hrvatska stranka prava de Ante Starrčević - HSP AS <br> + Ujedinjeni hrvatski domoljubi - UHD) |  |
|  | Independent Mislav Kolakušić |  |


| PL | PiS | Prawo i Sprawiedliwość |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Coal. KE | Coalition Koalicja Europejska (Platforma Obywatelska <br> + Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe + Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej <br> + Nowoczesna + Partia Zieloni) |
|  | Wiosna | Wiosna Roberta Biedronia |
| PT | PS | Partido Socialista |
|  | PSD | Partido Social Democrata |
|  | B.E. | Bloco de Esquerda |
|  | CDU (PCP + PEV) | Coligação Democrática Unitária (Partido Comunista Português <br> + Partido Ecologista os Verdes) |
|  | CDS-PP | CDS + Partido Popular |
|  | PAN | Pessoas-Animais-Natureza |
| RO | PNL | Partidul Național Liberal |
|  | PSD | Partidul Social Democrat |
|  | Coal. Alliance 2020 | Coalition 2020 USR + PLUS Alliance (Uniunea Salvați România <br> + Partidul Libertății, Unității și Solidarității) |
|  | Pro Romania | Partidul Pro Romania |
|  | PMP | Partidul Mișcarea Populară |
|  | UDMR | Romániai Magyar Demokrata Szövetség/Uniunea Democrată Maghiară din România |
| SE | S | Socialdemokraterna |
|  | M | Moderaterna |
|  | SD | Sverigedemokraterna |
|  | MP | Miljöpartiet de Gröna |
|  | C | Centerpartiet |
|  | KD | Kristdemokraterna |
|  | V | Vänsterpartiet |
|  | L | Liberalerna |
| SI | Coal. SDS + SLS | Coalition (Slovenska demokratska stranka + Slovenska ljudska stranka) |
|  | SD | Socialni demokrati |
|  | LMŠ | Lista Marjana Šarca |
|  | N.Si | Nova Slovenija |
| SK | Coal. PS + SPOLU | Coalition (Progresívne Slovensko + SPOLU - občianska demokracia) |
|  | SMER-SD | SMER - Sociálna demokracia |
|  | L'SNS | Kotleba - Ľudová strana Naše Slovensko |
|  | KDH | Krestanskodemokratické hnutie |
|  | SaS | Sloboda a Solidarita |
|  | Coal. OL'aNO + NOVA | Coalition (Obyčajní L’udia a nezávislé osobnosti + Nová väčšina - Dohoda) |
| UK | Brexit Party | Brexit Party |
|  | LibDem | Liberal Democrats |
|  | Lab. | Labour Party |
|  | GP | Green Party |
|  | Cons. | Conservative and Unionist Party |
|  | SNP | Scottish National Party |
|  | PL-PW | Plaid Cymru - Party of Wales |
|  | SF | Sinn Féin |
|  | DUP | Democratic Unionist Party |
|  | APNI | Alliance Party |

Source: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/election-results-2019/en

## Link to Electoral Authority of the MemberStates (as of June 2020)

| AT | https://www.bmi.gv.at/412/Europawahlen/Europawahl 2019/start.aspx |
| :---: | :---: |
| BE | https://wahlen2019.belgium.be/en/election?el=EU |
| BG | https://results.cik.bg/ep2019/rezultati/index.html |
| CY | http://live.elections.moi.qov.cy/English/EUROPEAN ELECTIONS 2019/Islandwide |
| CZ | https://volby.cz/pls/ep2019/ep?xjazyk=EN |
| DE | https://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/en/europawahlen/2019/ergebnisse/bund-99.html |
| DK | $\underline{\text { https://elections.sim.dk/ep-elections/results-of-the-european-parliament-elections-in-denmark-in-2019/ }}$ |
| EE | https://ep2019.valimised.ee/en/voting-result/index.html |
| EL | https://ekloges.ypes.ar/current/e/home/ |
| ES | http://www.juntaelectoralcentral.es/cs/jec/elecciones/Europeas-mayo2019 https://eleccioneslocaleseuropeas19.es/calendario-electoral.html |
| FI | $\underline{\text { https://tulospalvelu.vaalit.fi/EPV-2019/en/index.html }}$ |
| FR | $\underline{\text { https://www.interieur.qouv.fr/Elections/Les-resultats/Europeennes/elecresult europeennes-2019/ }}$ |
| HR | https://www.izbori.hr/site/izbori-referendumi/izbori-clanova-u-europski-parlament-iz-republike-hrvatske/izbori-clanova-u-europski-parlament-iz-republike-hrvatske-2019-1759/1759 |
| HU | https://www.valasztas.hu/ep2019 |
| IE | $\underline{\text { https://www.housing.gov.ie/sites/default/files/publications/files/a4 european results } 2019 \text { 0.pdf }}$ |
| IT | https://dait.interno.gov.it/elezioni/speciale-europee |
| LT | https://www.vrk.lt/en/2019-europos-parlamento/rezultatai <br> https://www.legislationline.org/download/id/5153/file/Lithuania_law_elections_european_parliament_2012_en.p df |
| LU | https://elections.public.lu/dam-assets/fr/elections-europeennes/2019/RECENSEMENT-GENERAL-2019.pdf |
| LV | https://epv2019.cvk.lv/pub/en/election-results https://www.cvk.Iv/en/elections/ep-elections/elections-to-the-european-parliament-2019 |
| MT | https:/electoral.gov.mt/ElectionResults/MEP?year=245\&v=null |
| NL | https://www.kiesraad.nl/verkiezingen/europees-parlement |
| PL | https://pe2019.pkw.qov.pl/pe2019/en |
| PT | http://www.cne.pt/sites/default/files/dl/2019 pe mapa resultados.pdf |
| RO | http://europarlamentare2019.bec.ro/rezultate/ http://legislatie.just.ro/Public/DetaliiDocumentAfis/90301 |
| SE | https://www.val.se/valresultat/europaparlamentet/2019/valresultat.html |
| SI | https://www.volitve.gov.si/ep2019/en/index.html\#/rezultati |
| SK | http://volby.statistics.sk/ep/ep2019/en/ <br> https://www.legislationline.org/download/id/7767/file/Slovakia Act European Parliamentary Elections 2003 a $\underline{\text { m2008 en.pdf }}$ |
| UK | http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-8600/CBP-8600.pdf https://www.eoni.org.uk/Elections/ |

This EPRS study provides an overview of the electoral systems and outcomes in the May 2019 elections to the European Parliament. It analyses the procedural details of how parties and candidates register their participation, how votes are cast, how valid votes are converted into seats, and how seats are assigned to candidates. For each Member State the paper describes the ballot structure and vote pattern used, the apportionment of seats among the Member State's domestic parties, and the assignment of the seats of a party to its candidates. It highlights aspects that are common to all Member States and captures peculiarities that are specific to some domestic provisions.

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[^0]:    1 We would like to thank Lorenzo Cicchi (Firenze), Svante Janson (Stockholm), Dragana Kopčić (Ljubljana) and officials from the EP's information offices in the Member States for valuable help. - All calculations in this paper were carried out using the software BAZI - Calculation of Allocations by Apportionment Methods in the Internet which is freely available at www.th-rosenheim.de/bazi.

    2 A compact synopsis is Giulio Sabbati, Gianluca Sgueo and Alina Dobreva (2019): 2019 European elections: National rules. At a Glance Infographic. European Parliamentary Research Service, PE623.556. For general analyses see, e.g., Donatella M. Viola (Editor) (2016): Routledge Handbook of European Elections, With a Foreword by J.H.H. Weiler, Routledge, London. For a specific analysis of the 2019 elections see, e.g., Rudolf Hrbek (2019): Europawahl 2019: neue politische Konstellationen für die Wahlperiode 2019-2024, Integration - Vierteljahreszeitschrift des Instituts für Europäische Politik in Zusammenarbeit mit dem Arbeitskreis Europäische Integration 42, 167-186.

    3 Andrew Duff (2011): Report (A7-0176/2011,28.7.2011) on a Proposal for a Modification of the Act Concerning the Election of the Members of the European Parliament by Direct Universal Suffrage of 20 September 1976 (2009/2134(INI)). Committee on Constitutional Affairs of the European Parliament, PE 440.210v04-00. See also Edward Whitfield (2015): $40^{\text {th }}$ Anniversary of the 1976 Act on Direct Elections to the European Parliament, European Parliamentary Research Service Historical Archive Unit, PE 563.513. Olivier Costa (2016): The history of European electoral reform and the Electoral Act 1976, Issues of democratisation and political legitimacy, Study, European Parliamentary Research Service Historical Archive Unit, PE 563.516, and Silvia Kotanidis (2019): European Union electoral law. Current situation and historical background. European Parliamentary Research Service, PE 642.250.

    4 Similar material for the 2014 elections is provided by Wilhelm Lehmann (2014):The European elections: EU legislation, national provisions and civic participation, Study for the AFCO Committee, Revised edition, European Parliament, PE 493.047, and Luciano Bardi and Lorenzo Cicchi (2015): Electoral rules and electoral participation in the European elections: the ballot format and structure. Study for the AFCO Committee, European Parliament, PE 536.464.

    5 See the appendix for a table listing two-letter code, short name and official name of each Member State.

[^1]:    6 For surveys of past elections see Kai-Friederike Oelbermann and Friedrich Pukelsheim (2015): European elections 2014: From voters to representatives, in twenty-eight ways. Evropská volební studia - European Electoral Studies 10, 91124, and Kai-Friederike Oelbermann, Antonio Palomares and Friedrich Pukelsheim (2010): The 2009 European Parliament elections: From votes to seats in 27 ways. Evropská volební studia - European Electoral Studies 5, 148-182. Erratum, ibidem 6 (2011) 85.

[^2]:    7 See, e.g., Geoffrey Grimmett, Jean-François Laslier, Friedrich Pukelsheim, Victoriano Ramírez González, Richard Rose, Wojciech Słomczyński, Martin Zachariasen and Karol Życzkowski (2011): The Allocation Between the EU Member States of the Seats in the European Parliament - Cambridge Compromise. Note. European Parliament, DirectorateGeneral for Internal Policies, Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs, PE 432.760, and Geoffrey Grimmett, Friedrich Pukelsheim, Victoriano Ramírez González, Wojciech Słomczyński and Karol Życzkowski (2017): The Composition of the European Parliament. Workshop 30 January 2017. Compilation: Two briefings and one indepth analysis. European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs, PE 583.117.

    8 See Friedrich Pukelsheim and Geoffrey Grimmett (2018): Degressive representation of Member States in the European Parliament 2019-2024. Representation - Journal of Representative Democracy 54, 147-158.

[^3]:    9 See, e.g., Friedrich Pukelsheim (2017): Proportional Representation - Apportionment Methods and Their Applications, With a foreword by Andrew Duff MEP, Second Edition, Springer International Publishing AG, Cham (CH).

[^4]:    10 The term 'roughly' is taken to be synonymous for 'up to the final step of rounding', here: of rounding downwards.

[^5]:    11 The same apportionment emerges when using the divisor method with upward rounding (with divisor 250 000).

[^6]:    12 This behavior is called an Alabama paradox, see, e.g., Pukelsheim (2017): Proportional Representation (op. cit.), Section 9.12. In 1881, the reapportionment of the US Congress was considered. The application of the current system at the time would have resulted in the state of Alabama having 8 representatives in a House of 299 members but 7 representatives in a House of 300 Members.

[^7]:    13 Legge 22 aprile 2014, n. 65. - The dossier of the Italian Ministry of Interior includes calculations for the 76 seats after the UK leaves the EU, but it is silent on the handling of the seats before this event, see Elezioni dei Membri del Parlamento Europeo Spettanti all'Italia 26 maggio 2019, Il Dossier. Dipartimento per gli Affari Interni e Territoriali, Ministero dell'Interno. Maggio 2019 rev.1.1, 259 pages [www.interno.gov.it].

[^8]:    14 The apportionment method HaQgrR is unbiased, i.e. on average no participant is favored nor disadvantaged. Unbiased methods (HaQgrR, DivStd) are preferred for the apportionment of seats among several district-lists of a party. The method DivDwn is biased, in that on average it favors stronger participants at the expense of weaker participants. This direction of bias is attractive to many experts as far as the apportionment of seats among political parties is concerned. For more on the concept of bias see Pukelsheim (2017): Proportional Representation (op.cit.), Chap. 7.
    15 These effects are paraphrased to be an instance of the Alabama paradox. Quota methods are susceptible to the paradox, divisor methods are immune against it. See also the note in Section 3.15.

[^9]:    16 Domestic provisions assign seats to candidates below the bypass hurdle in a more elaborate way, see, e.g., Svante Janson (2016): Phragmén's and Thiele's election methods, arxiv.org/abs/1611.08826, or Rosa Camps, Xavier Mora and

[^10]:    17 Friedrich Pukelsheim (2018): Compositional proportionality among European political parties at European Parliament elections, Středoevropské politické studie - Central European Political Studies Review 20,1-15.

[^11]:    18 See Sergio Alonso de León (2017): Four decades of the European Electoral Act: a look back and a look ahead to an unfulfilled ambition, European Law Review 42, 353-368.

    19 Council Decision (EU, Euratom) 2018/994 of 13 July 2018 amending the Act concerning the election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, annexed to Council Decision 76/787/ECSC, EEC, Euratom of 20 September 1976, Official Journal of the European Union L 178 (16.7.2018) 1-3.

[^12]:    20 BVerfGE 89, 155 (185) Maastricht. For critical comments of the Court's more recent assessment of the European Parliament's democratic legitimacy see, among many others, Martin Selmayr (2009): Endstation Lissabon? Zehn Thesen zum "Niemals"-Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts vom 30. Juni 2009, Zeitschrift für europarechtliche Studien 12,647-656.

    21 See, e.g., Andrew Duff (2019): The European Union makes a new push for democracy, Discussion paper, European Politics and Institutions Programme, European Policy Centre, 28 November 2019.

